# 1nc

## T

Energy production is limited to extraction- the aff allows affs that impact the entire energy sector

Sagar, PhD materials science, Oliver, PhD engineering, and Chikkatur, PhD physics, ‘5

(Ambuj, Hongyan, and Ananth, all three are research fellows – Kennedy School of Govt @ Harvard, 7 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1)

The energy sector encompasses activities relating to the production, conversion, and use of energy. Energy production includes the extraction of primary energy forms such as coal, oil, and natural gas, or growing biomass for energy uses. Energy conversion pertains to the transformation of energy into more useful forms: this includes the refining of petroleum to yield products such as gasoline and diesel; the combustion of coal in power plants to yield electricity; the production of alcohol from biomass, etc. Energy end-use encompasses the final use of energy forms in industrial, residential, commercial, transportation and other end-uses.

**Vote neg-**

**1- limits- allows any aff that affects energy production in some way- makes predictable neg prep impossible**

**2- ground- avoids the core of the topic, which is energy production itself- spikes out of links to oil, coal, and nat gas da’s**

## T

**Plans a fiscal incentive not a financial incentive**

**Czinkota et al, 9 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

**Incentives** offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments **are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial**. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

**Vote neg-**

**1- limits- makes any mech potentially topical- can’t predict a huge combo of new mechs**

**2- ground- links out of core da’s based off loan guarantees and other topical mechs**

## K

**Oil energy production policy is grounded within a global system of inequality and militarism – Enables continued reactionary violence and environmental destruction**

Byrne and Toley 6 (John – Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy – It’s a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy – John is also a Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware – 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Toley – Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs - Selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013 - expertise includes issues related to urban and environmental politics, global cities, and public policy, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse,” p. 1-32)

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss, the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dila that also accompanies this system’s operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the **socially privileged**. Two billion human beings—almost one-third of the planet’s population—experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact—and sometimes **exacerbated**—**social inequalities** that its architects promised would be banished (Smil, 2003: 370 - 373). And there is the **disturbing link** between modern energy and war. 3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or **as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future**. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector’s performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of **euphoric technological visions** and associated studies of “energy futures” that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices. 4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power 12 Transforming Power who, early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg, 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, cited in the New York Times 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the “magical fire” or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize “inherently safe reactors” (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, **forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm** (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in “sustainable energy alternatives” that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, “green” energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy “haves” and “havenots.” 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291), “today’s nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people” as “micropower meets village power.” Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a “solar global economy... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world’s cultural diversity” (Scheer, 2002: 34). 6 **The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity** (Nye, 1999). **The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet’s climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime’s operations**. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. 02Chapter1.pmd 2 1/6/2006, 2:56 PMEnergy as a Social Project 3 By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ...an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity—here are the enemies. The living organism demands a life-sustaining environment.

**The impact is Extinction – The K turns the aff and the aff causes error replication. They can’t address the root cause**

**Ahmed 12** Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the **unsustainable** **depletion of hydrocarbon** and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global financial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as **separate processes**. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is **embedded**. In this context, orthodox IR's flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, **reifying** the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘**Otherisation’** of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a **wider** epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes**.** In 2009, the UK government's chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action 'drivers' of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a 'perfect storm' of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030.1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics. While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, 'most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.\*" Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be 'secured\* and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing **systemic and structural obstacles** to the implementation of desired reforms. In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an **empirically-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration** of the **best available data** on four major global crises — climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability — illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a **reductionist**, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are 'securitised\* as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously **exacerbates** the danger of **reactionary violence**, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource 'shortages\* or 'abundance\* causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in **violent conflict**.

**Vote neg - methodological investigation is a prior question to the aff –policy focus sustains a violent business-as-usual approach**

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

The way in which **energy policy is “framed**” refers to the **underlying assumptions policy is based on** and the ways in which **policy debates ‘construct’, emphasise and link particular issues**. For example energy ‘security of supply’ is often emphasised in arguments favouring nuclear-generated electricity. A more limited framing effect operates on individuals in opinion polls and public referendums: here the way in which questions are posed has a strong influence on responses. The bigger, social framing effect referred to here colours societies’ thinking about whole areas of public life, in this case energy use and its environmental impacts. A key element of the proposed reframing advanced by commentators concerned with decarbonising energy use (see, for example, [Scrase and MacKerron, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib25)) is to cease treating energy as just commercial units of fuel and electricity, and instead to focus on the energy ‘services’ people need (warmth, lighting, mobility and so on). This paper helps to explain why any such reframing, however logical and appealing, is politically very challenging if it goes against the perceived interests of powerful groups, particularly when these interests are aligned with certain imperatives which governments must fulfil if they are to avoid electoral defeat. There is a **dominant conception** of **policy-making as an objective, linear process**. In essence the process is portrayed as proceeding in a series of steps from facts to analysis, and then to solutions (for a detailed critique of this linear view see [Fischer, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib11)). In reality, policy-making is usually messy and political, rife with the exercise of **interests and power**. **The veneer of objective, rational policy-making**, that the dominant, linear model of policy-making supports is therefore cause for concern. It effectively sustains energy policy ‘business as usual’ and excludes many relevant voices that might be effective in opening up space to reframe energy policy problems and move towards more sustainable solutions (see, for example, [Ockwell, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib21)). This echoes concerns with what counts as knowledge and whose voices are heard in policy debates that have characterised strands of several literatures in recent decades, including science and technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, and various strands of the political science and development literatures, particularly in the context of knowledge, discourse and democracy. An alternative to the linear model is provided by a ‘discourse’ perspective. This draws on political scientists’ observations of ways in which politics and policy-making proceed through the use of language, and the expression of values and the assumptions therein. Discourse can be understood as: ‘… a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language it enables subscribers to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements…’ [Dryzek (1997, p.8)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib5). A discursive approach rejects the widely held assumption that policy language is a **neutral medium** through which ideas and an objective world are represented and discussed ([Darcy, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib4)). Discourse analysts examine and explain language use in a way that helps to **reveal the underlying interests, value judgements and beliefs** that are often **disguised by policy actors’** factual claims and the arguments that these are used to support. For example UK energy policy review documents issued in 2006–2007 are criticised below for presenting information in ways that subtly but consistently favoured new nuclear power while purporting to be undecided on the issue. People (including scientific and policy experts) **base their understanding of problems and solutions on their knowledge, experiences, interpretations and value judgements**. These are **coloured and shaped** by social interactions, for example by what is considered an ‘appropriate’ perspective in one's work life within certain institutions. Policy actors therefore expend considerable effort on influencing the design and evolution of institutions in order to ensure problems and solutions are framed in ways they favour. Thus discourse is fundamental to the way that institutions are created, but in the short-term institutions also have a constraining or structuring effect. At a more fundamental level there are even more rigid constraints, which can be identified as a set of core imperatives, such as sustained economic growth and national security, which states and their governments, with very few exceptions, must fulfil in order to ensure their survival ([Dryzek et al., 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471" \l "bib6)—these are explored in detail further below).

## Politics

**Immigration will pass- Obama is pushing**

Sink and Mali 3-25. [Justin, Meghashyam, reporters, "Obama: 'The time has come' to move immigration reform in Congress" The HIll -- thehill.com/video/administration/290129-obama-the-time-has-come-to-move-immigration-reform]

Obama said he expects debate on an immigration bill to “begin **next month**” at a ceremony where 28 people, including 13 armed servicemembers, became citizens.¶ **Bipartisan groups** in both the **House and Senate** are moving closer to unveiling separate immigration reform proposals, and the president is hoping to build momentum for a deal**.¶ “**We've known for years that our immigration system is broken, that we're not doing enough to harness the talent and ingenuity of all those who want to work hard and find a place in America,” Obama said. “And after avoiding the problem for years, the time has come to fix it once and for all. The time has come for comprehensive, sensible immigration reform.”¶ Speaking from the East Room, Obama argued that immigration strengthens the country.¶ “It keeps us vibrant, it keeps us hungry, it keeps us prosperous. It is what makes us such a dynamic country,” he said. “If we want to keep attracting the best and the brightest, we've got to do a better job of welcoming them.”¶ Advocates for immigration reform see a **real chance** for legislation to pass Congress this year, **despite opposition** from some House GOP lawmakers, many of whom have said they will oppose measures that grant “amnesty” to illegal immigrants and have questioned proposed protections for gay or lesbian couples.¶ Immigration reform is a potent political issue for Obama, who won more than 70 percent of the Hispanic vote in 2012. Since that showing, a growing number of conservative lawmakers have signaled they would back immigration reform, including measures to provide a pathway to citizenship.¶ Groups aligned with Obama have signaled their intention of **pressuring Congress**.¶ On Monday, The New York Times reported that Organizing for Action — the political group born from the president's reelection campaign — will launch a new online effort featuring the stories of some 7,000 supporters, some of whom entered the country illegally.¶ The Senate’s “Gang of Eight” introduced their framework, calling for a pathway to citizenship, heightened border security, increased high-skilled immigration and a guest worker program, in January.¶ But since then, senators have been tied down in negotiations over the details of the plan, with many key issues still unresolved.¶ Obama said he wanted to **see debate begin** on a congressional bill **by April**.¶ “We are making progress, but we've got to finish the job, because this issue is not new,” Obama said. “Everyone pretty much knows what's broken, everyone knows how to fix it.”¶ At a briefing later Monday with reporters, White House spokesman Josh Earnest insisted that the White House did not hold the event over concern with the progress of negotiations.¶ "We are pleased **with the progress they are** reportedly **making**" in the Senate, Earnest said, adding that President Obama **had been in touch with** members of **the Gang of** Eight.¶ Earnest also dismissed criticism from freshman Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who suggested over the weekend that Obama secretly hoped talks would fall through, so Democrats could gain a political wedge for the 2014 midterm elections.¶ "There's no evidence to support those claims," Earnest said.¶ Members of the Senate group predict their plan could move forward when legislators return from a two-week Easter break.¶ A **bipartisan House group** has yet to share details of their proposals, but their work has already **received general support** from leaders in both parties.

**Plan is a political disaster**

**Mills ‘11** [Robin, MSc in Geological Sciences at Cambridge, “Capturing Carbon: The New Weapon in the War Against Climate Change,” Google Book]

CCS already labours under something of a public **relations disadvan­tage**, due to its association with the **unpopular petroleum**, coal and electricity industries. It needs only to attract support from politicians, lawyers and real-estate agents to be completely condemned. CCS might suffer from its **promotion by the Bush-era initiative** on the 'Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate', widely (and rather accurately) perceived as a literal and metaphorical smokescreen for pol­luting countries and industries to escape mandatory carbon curbs8 and dismissed as 'a nice little PR ploy' by none other than former presiden­tial candidate John McCain.9 The debate is further clouded by 'clean coal', a term trotted out by industry groups such as the American Coa­lition for Clean Coal Electricity. Indeed, coal has become vastly cleaner in recent years in terms of non-greenhouse pollutants such as sulphur dioxide. But to be meaningful at all, 'clean coal' has to include carbon capture on at least 85-95% of its emissions. Otherwise, as in Joel and Ethan Coen's satirical adverts,10 'clean coal' becomes a byword for hype, empty spin and evading environmental responsibility. Such bad press leads the **public to be suspicious** of carbon capture's environmental and safety credentials. There is a natural cynicism when industry proposes a solution so convenient to itself, however solid the scientific arguments. Scrutiny is intensified when the oil and coal indus­tries take the lead in campaigning against climate change bills, as dur­ing August 2009,n and score PR own-goals such as forging letters opposing environmental legislation. Part of this lobbying is a reaction to elements of the proposed legislation, rather than to the idea of limit­ing carbon dioxide emissions per se, but the subtlety of this message can easily be lost. Carbon capture may come to be seen—indeed, is sometimes already **seen—as just one more tactic from the energy industry to delay or avoid taking real action on climate change**.12 The major elements of the fossil fuel industry, particularly in the USA, were so slow to acknowledge the reality of climate change, denied the science at every turn, and still continue to spread doubt and misinformation, even allegedly generating fraudulent grass-roots campaigns.1" By doing so, they set themselves up to be the villains of the piece. To some extent, the global debate over carbon capture (and, indeed, over climate change legislation) is now being held **hostage by the ideological clash in the USA between left and right**. In Europe, a few mavericks apart, business and environmentalism agree much more closely than they might realise on the science of climate change, and the key solutions. Such public **opposition can lead to lengthy delays, lawsuits, planning inquiries, permitting challenges and direct protests,** against new CCS power plants, carbon dioxide pipelines and storage sites. A backlash from taxpayers or electricity consumers might be caused by percep­tions that heavy subsidies or rising power prices are being used to sup­port carbon capture. The substantial government aid being given to renewable energy in many developed countries may be more popular. Government programmes, as with America's FutureGen, may be more vulnerable to cuts amid the fickle winds of political fortune than those led by companies planning for their future. Recovery from the financial crisis will, at some point, have to be paid for by spending cuts and tax increases, and this may crimp funding for new technologies, however environmentally vital.

**PC key**

Anniston Star, 3-27 [Editorial Board, "On the offensive: Obama is wise to start anew the push for immigration reform," 3-27-13, annistonstar.com/view/full\_story/22088295/article-On-the-offensive--Obama-is-wise-to-start-anew-the-push-for-immigration-reform?instance=opinion\_lead, accessed 3-28-13, mss]

The point: President Obama didn’t fulfill his promise of securing sweeping immigration-reform policies during his first term. Now in his second, Obama is beginning a new campaign to urge legislators — particularly Republicans — to find a bipartisan compromise that (a.) **isn’t watered down** and (b.) is effective. It’s a lot to ask. Nevertheless, Obama is wise to go on this offensive. The need, as always, is great. An Associated Press report this week points out that the president is working behind the scenes in order to **keep Republicans at the** negotiating **table** between now and Congress’ April 8 return from spring break. The key is the Senate working group, the Gang of Eight, that is putting together a bipartisan plan the White House has yet to see. “We’ll reserve judgment on the product of those discussions until it’s produced,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest said.

**Only comprehensive reform solves Mexican relations- that’s key to solving terrorism**

**Castaneda et al. ‘5** (NORTH AMERICAN COOPERATION ON THE BORDER HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JULY 12, 2005 Castaneda, Hon. Jorge, Global Distinguished Professor of Politics and Latin American and Caribbean Studies, New York University, and former Foreign Minister, Mexico City, Mexico............... Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois................... 37 Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware

I think that attitudes in Mexico have changed in relation to drugs and I think that they are also changing in relation to terrorism, that there is a sense in Mexico, particularly as cooperation with the United States increases--and it is increasing--and as cooperation with Canada is increasing--and it is increasing--that the threats of **terrorism** to the United States are **threats** that are also extensive to Mexico and to Canada and that we have to view this from a North American perspective. That does not mean, Senator, of course, in the same way as in the United States, that everyone in Mexico who subscribes to these points of view, as myself, necessarily agrees with every decision made by the United States administration, for example, in the war on terrorism. Senator Biden. I do not agree with it all. Mr. Castaneda. I know full well, and I know Senator Dodd does not either. I know that in Mexico there are many views on this. But I do agree with you completely on this fact that we have to find a **way in Mexico to understand** that **these are common security threats**. A threat to the United States, to London, to Spain, the Atocha attacks in Madrid 2 years ago, all of these terrorist attacks are attacks that can happen in Mexico any day of the year, and for the same absurd reasons that they happen elsewhere. There are no good reasons for terrorist attacks and consequently they can happen anywhere at any time. Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. Please proceed, Senator Obama. STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The ranking member asked some important questions and I think they encompass a broader concern. I think when I think about immigration I think there are a number of elements to it, some of which have been covered today. The politics of immigration in this country are extraordinarily complex and I think Senator Biden was touching on whether the politics in your countries can generate the same amount of effort. So let me turn to you, Mr. Castaneda, first and just ask whether--from your testimony, I gather that you believe that without **c**omprehensive **i**mmigration **r**eform it is going to be **hard to initiate anything** piecemeal. Do you get a sense right now that your country is prepared to make significant investments if, for example, Senator Kennedy and McCain's bill moves forward, that, in fact, you would see some concomitant investments in terms of border security or other strategies on the other side of the border at this stage? I mean, is there enough sort of political momentum that people would see that as a fair trade? Mr. Castaneda. I do believe so, Senator Obama. I think that precisely what the Fox administration has been able to do--and, of course, it is winding down; we are only a year away from the elections and a year and a half away from President Fox leaving office. But I think what the Fox administration has been able to do is precisely to explain to the Mexican people that if we can get the sort of agreement or reform in the United States that addresses all of these issues that I mention in my opening remarks, regarding Mexicans already here, and in your home State in particular, Mexicans who will continue to come because that is what the demographics and the economics of our relationship imply, if we can get many of the things that we think are important, that we can put an end to the deaths in the desert every single day, **then Mexico is prepared to do its share**, prepared to put its **money where its mouth is**, but not only its money. It is not so much a question on our side of money. It is a question of **political will,** of making the **very tough decisions on the** southern **border**, the very tough decisions in the sending community, the very tough decisions along the chokepoints on the highways and air routes to the border, make the tough decisions that will **make an agreement** sellable in the United States and **viable** in the long run **for the two countries.** I think that today in Mexico this is doable, and I must say it is largely doable because President Fox has made an effort to educate Mexican society about these issues.

**Leads to WMD terrorism on US soil**

**AP ‘8 –** citing a veteran CIA analyst

(US Officials Fear Terrorist Links With Drug Lords, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=5986948>)

There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday. Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S. "The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the United States," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst. "The threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them."

**Nuke terrorism causes extinction**

**Hellman ‘8** (Martin Hellman, Stanford Professor Emeritus, 2008, “Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?”, http://nuclearrisk.org/1why\_now.php,)

One of the possible triggers for a full-scale nuclear war is an act of nuclear terrorism. Particularly if directed against an American or Russian city, the resultant chaos has the potential to push the world over the nuclear cliff, much as a terrorist act in Sarajevo in 1914 was the spark that set off the First World War. Conversely, the danger of nuclear terrorism is increased by the large number of nuclear weapons. With over 25,000 still in existence and thousands of people involved in their maintenance, storage and security, the chance for error, theft or illicit sale is much too high.

**Bioterror causes extinction**

**Steinbruner ’97** (John D. Steinbruner, Brookings senior fellow and chair in international security, vice chair of the committee on international security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, Winter 1997, Foreign Policy, “Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses,” n109 p85(12), infotrac

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

### 1NC – States

#### Washington D.C., the fifty states, and all relevant territories should

#### provide a tax credit for enhanced oil recovery that uses industrial carbon dioxide in the United States.

#### substantially reduce restrictions on state property laws for Carbon Capture and Storage producers in the United States.

#### assume long-term liability protection for Carbon Capture and Storage producers in the United States.

#### amend their constitutions to extend their balanced budget horizon from one to five years.

#### establish a dedicated funding stream for tax credit for enhanced oil recovery that uses industrial carbon dioxide in the United States.

#### issue memorandums to energy producers that tax credits for enhanced oil recovery that uses industrial carbon dioxide are available for energy producers in the United States.

**States solve**

NEORI 12

The National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI), formed by Center for

Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) and the Great Plains Institute (GPI), Feb 2012, CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf

OVERVIEW OF MODEL STATE INCENTIVES FOR CO2-EOR DEPLOYMENT TO COMPLEMENT FEDERAL SUPPORT Several states have incentives to encourage CO2 capture and transport from power plants and industrial facilities, which complement federal grants, tax credits, and other support mechanisms. States with these incentives have provided critical support for projects to advance toward deployment. Furthermore, as with the new federal tax credit recommended in this report, state incentives for commercial CO2 capture and pipeline projects have the potential to be revenue positive, stimulate local oil production, and spur economic activity at a time when most states face profound fiscal challenges. NEORI recommends consideration, adoption or adaptation of the following state policies to complement federal policy and encourage commercial deployment of CO2 capture and transport technologies.

**Balanced Budget horizon plank solves state budget shortfalls**

Ruffini 9 (Patrick, Republican online strategist, “The Solution to the state fiscal crisis: a five year balanced budget?”, Next Right, 2/22/09, <http://www.thenextright.com/patrick-ruffini/the-solution-to-the-state-fiscal-crisis-a-five-year-balanced-budget>)

Back in the Contract with America days, a Balanced Budget Amendment was a major tenet of Republican policy, and a couple of times, it came close enough to passing Congress to inspire furious lobbying and vitriolic sky-is-falling claims from the Democrats. A balanced budget requirement isn't some radical pie-in-the-sky idea. 49 out of 50 states have it. The good news is that it works -- those states are actually forced to balance their budget. The bad news is that it's often ugly, with drastic spending cuts and tax increases in many states in the current budget year. Albeit more responsible than rampant deficit spending at the federal level, the states aren't any less short term in their thinking than the feds. In good years, state governments rush to spend the surplus only to abruptly cancel programs in a recession -- because there's no real incentive to bank surpluses against a downturn or use state rainy day funds. A budget $5 billion in surplus is just as balanced as one with $0 in surplus, so the politicians might as well spend the money currying favor with voters. The only way I can think of to stop this problem is to extend the horizon of the balanced budget from one year to five years. Essentially, the budget would have to be in balance over the course of 5 years, covering most recessions with 2 or 3 years of recovery. **In bad times, states could deficit spend** -- by no more than the surpluses of the previous four years. **In good times, states would be forced to bank surpluses** -- particularly if the past few years were economically tough. One downside is that politicians use it to recreate the present, with budgets just barely in balance across the board, but more likely than not, the politically convenient thing to do would be to slip into a deficit for one or two years, thus kicking off a **virtuous circle where subsequent years' budgets would not only have to be in balance, but the extra debt** accumulated during a recession would have to be paid off. This could head **off irresponsible spending** binges in good times and keep **state budgets** on more of an **even** keel. It's true that budgets wouldn't have to be balanced every year -- though the overall fiscal impact is the same -- but it sure beats the farce of Washington needing to bail out the states when they run off the rails.

## Solv

#### Impact is too slow and tiny at best

Ozzie Zehner, visiting scholar at Berkeley, Energy policy analayst on issues of social, political and economic conditions, PhD, Science and Technology studies, 12 [“Green illusions” Non-Profit book]

Scientists and legislators may ultimately decide that the risks and costs of carbon sequestration are worth it to reduce carbon dioxide buildup in the atmosphere. Even then, optimists suggest that carbon sequestration technologies won't be ready for **mainstream deployment** for **at least** another twenty years. A lot of coal will have been burned by then. Assuming that nations could muster the political will, technologies, and funding to develop carbon capture and storage, how effective would it be? A study group in Australia, one of the largest coal-producing nations, set out to answer this question. Their findings are humbling. They determined that the cumulative co2 emissions reduction over the **first thirty years** of a sequestration program would be just 2.4 percent—not terribly impressive given the costs and risks that such an undertaking would involve.24

#### Plan takes too long, and it can only be applied to 20% of U.S. plants – their author

Moniz and Tinker 10 – Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems @ Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the Bureau of Economic Geology @ University of Texas at Austin Ernest J. Moniz and Scott W. Tinker “Role of Enhanced Oil Recovery in Accelerating the Deployment of Carbon Capture and Sequestration,” An MIT Energy Initiative and Bureau of Economic Geology at UT Austin Symposium, July 23, 2010

• It takes time to scale-up any industrial enterprise, including EOR, several-fold. • EOR with CO2 from coal power plants will not be commercially viable absent government subsidy or until CO2 emissions are priced substantially, and such pricing does not appear imminent. • It will take a considerable time to retrofit as much as 50 GWe of the coal fleet for carbon capture and the opportunities may not be much beyond this level: with today’s capture technology, as little as 20% of the existing US coal plants may be serious candidates for CO2 capture retrofit (see Retrofitting of Coal-fired Power Plants for CO2 Emissions Reductions, proceedings of a 2009 MITEI Symposium, web.mit.edu/mitei).

#### Can’t solve pipelines and tons of regulatory barriers – their author

Moniz and Tinker 10 – Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems @ Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the Bureau of Economic Geology @ University of Texas at Austin Ernest J. Moniz and Scott W. Tinker “Role of Enhanced Oil Recovery in Accelerating the Deployment of Carbon Capture and Sequestration,” An MIT Energy Initiative and Bureau of Economic Geology at UT Austin Symposium, July 23, 2010

• Infrastructure Federal CCS programs have paid relatively little attention to the CO2 transportation infrastructure, but this is a key enabler for building both EOR and DSF sequestration. Looking well into the future, a CO2-EOR program utilizing hundreds of millions of tons of CO2 annually will likely require tens of thousands of miles of CO2 pipeline. A “giant horseshoe” configuration was discussed at the symposium, linking the major CO2 sources of the Midwest with the producing regions of the Gulf Coast, West Texas, and the Rockies. Clearly, such an ambitious undertaking should occur with public support only with evidence that large-scale CO2-EOR using anthropogenic sources will materialize as an opportunity for both climate risk mitigation and enhanced oil production. Satisfying these needs will probably require sustained “high” (i.e., current) oil price levels and a price (or cap) on CO2 emissions. However, even the initial steps to implement anthropogenic CO2-EOR should be taken with a view toward beginning to build the physical infrastructure in a way that would be needed for a future major scale-up. In the longer term, other issues will certainly arise as to how a large pipeline infrastructure is built and regulated when part of its purpose is to serve an environmental public good (CO2 “disposal”). For example, will major pipelines be required to serve as common carriers? Will the federal government take on some measure of siting authority, as it does with natural gas pipelines (and more recently with electricity transmission lines)? These questions do not need to be answered immediately, but they merit near-term stakeholder discussion to map out the regulatory landscape in case the value proposition becomes attractive sooner rather than later.

#### CCS fails without a climate policy – no incentive

Brian Handwerk, Energy Expert – National Geographic, 12 [“Amid Economic Concerns, Carbon Capture Faces a Hazy Future,” National Geographic, May 22, pdf]

Carbon capture and storage could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by capturing CO2 where it's produced and storing it permanently in various types of underground geological reservoirs. The International Energy Agency (IEA) believes CCS technology can dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions when implemented at dirty fossil fuel power plants and other industrial facilities that enlarge the world's CO2 footprint. The IEA would like to see more than 3,000 CCS-equipped plants come online by mid-century to achieve 20 percent of planned reductions in CO2 emissions. But no large-scale projects currently operate at power plants, and Howard Herzog, a CCS expert at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), said efforts to scale up the industry are largely on hold. "I'd say the biggest problem we have right now is that there is not a market for CCS because there is no climate policy," Herzog said. "This technology can effectively help lower CO2 emissions in the atmosphere but that will always cost more than letting business as usual go on. So as long as there is no policy to stop business as usual, it will go on." The United States has failed to enact a climate policy. And other nations, in turn, have not reached a strong international agreement on mandatory carbon emissions reductions without the largest historic polluter at the negotiating table. As a result, the envisioned market-based solution, where companies could gain valuable "credits" for steps they would take to reduce emissions while others would face new costs for failure to act, has never gained traction. CCS is so costly that such an incentive system is necessary for its development. Herzog pointed to the American Electric Power Mountaineer coal power plantproject in New Haven, West Virginia, where carbon produced at a coal plant was to be sequestered deep in Mount Simon sandstone. The U.S. Department of Energy was slated to fund half of the project's costs, up to $334 million, but after a successful pilot project, AEP canceled Phase 2 CCS at the site last summer. The decision was attributed to a weak economy and an uncertain U.S. policy on climate and carbon. "They got half of the money from government stimulus and the other half had to come from somewhere," Herzog explained. In Virginia, which receives power generated by Mountaineer, the State Corporation Commission declined requests to pass costs on to consumers through rate hikes. "The utility said, 'Why should our rate payers pay for a technology that we may not even use?' There's no climate policy. If there was going to be a (carbon) market in the future you could make the case that you pay more now so that it's cheaper in the future. But with no clear indication of a future market, people don't want to pay more. The story is similar in Europe, which launched its own carbon market in 2005 under the international agreement known as the Kyoto Protocol. That effort has been hampered because the United States never signed on to the protocol, and today's largest carbon emitter, China, like other developing nations, faces no mandatory reductions. The EU system isn't succeeding in spurring CCS projects because the permits, which have fallen to prices around $8 (6 euros) a ton, simply don't have enough value cover the high cost of CCS. China isinitiating several pilot carbon trading schemes next year, and the outcome of that trial will have a large impact on other carbon markets worldwide. MIT's Herzog still believes the technology could someday compete with low-cost alternatives. "It can have a reasonable market share and bring down the overall cost of meeting carbon reduction targets," he said. "But **when there are no carbon reduction targets, there is nothing to bring down** the **cost** of."

## Warming

**U.S can’t solve warming**

**Grose ‘3-15**

(Thomas K., National Geographic News Writer, “As U.S. Cleans Its Energy Mix, It Ships Coal Problems Abroad”

Ready for some good news about the environment? Emissions of carbon dioxide in the United States are declining. But don't celebrate just yet. A major side effect of that cleaner air in the U.S. has been the further darkening of skies over Europe and Asia. The United States essentially is exporting a share of its greenhouse gas emissions in the form of coal, data show. If the trend continues, the dramatic changes in energy use in the United States—in particular, the switch from coal to newly abundant natural gas for generating electricity—will have only a modest impact on global warming, observers warn. The Earth's atmosphere will continue to absorb heat-trapping CO2, with a similar contribution from U.S. coal. It will simply be burned overseas instead of at home. "Switching from coal to gas only saves carbon if the coal stays in the ground," said John Broderick, lead author of a study on the issue by the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research at England's Manchester University. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released data this week showing that United States coal exports hit a record 126 million short tons in 2012, a 17 percent increase over the previous year. Overseas shipments surpassed the previous high mark set in 1981 by 12 percent. The United States clearly is using less coal: Domestic consumption fell by about 114 million tons, or 11 percent, largely due to a decline in the use of coal for electricity. But U.S. coal production fell just 7 percent. The United States, with the world's largest coal reserves, continued to churn out the most carbon-intensive fuel, producing 1 billion tons of coal from its mines in 2012. Emissions Sink The EIA estimates that due largely to the drop in coal-fired electricity, U.S. carbon emissions from burning fossil fuel declined 3.4 percent in 2012. If the numbers hold up, it will extend the downward trend that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) outlined last month in its annual greenhouse gas inventory, which found greenhouse gas emissions in 2011 had fallen 8 percent from their 2007 peak to 6,703 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent (a number that includes sources other than energy, like methane emissions from agriculture). In fact, if you don't count the recession year of 2009, U.S. emissions in 2011 dropped to their lowest level since 1995. President Barack Obama counted the trend among his environmental accomplishments in his State of the Union address last month: "Over the last four years, our emissions of the dangerous carbon pollution that threatens our planet have actually fallen." The reason is clear: Coal, which in 2005 generated 50 percent of U.S. electricity, saw its share erode to 37.4 percent in 2012, according to EIA's new short-term energy outlook. An increase in U.S. renewable energy certainly played a role; renewables climbed in those seven years from 8.7 percent to 13 percent of the energy mix, about half of it hydropower. But the big gain came from natural gas, which climbed from 19 percent to 30.4 percent of U.S. electricity during that time frame, primarily because of abundant supply and low prices made possible by hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. The trend appears on track to continue, with U.S. coal-fired plants being retired at a record pace. But U.S. coal producers haven't been standing still as their domestic market has evaporated. They've been shipping their fuel to energy-hungry markets overseas, from the ports of Norfolk, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Although demand is growing rapidly in Asia—U.S. coal exports to China were on track to double last year—Europe was the biggest customer, importing more U.S. coal last year than all other countries combined. The Netherlands, with Europe's largest port, Rotterdam, accepted the most shipments, on pace for a 24 jump in U.S. coal imports in 2012. The United Kingdom, the second largest customer, saw its U.S. coal imports jump more than 70 percent. The hike in European coal consumption would appear to run counter to big government initiatives across the Continent to cut CO2 emissions. But in the European Union, where fracking has made only its initial forays and natural gas is still expensive, American coal is, well, dirt cheap. European utilities are now finding that generating power from coal is a profitable gambit. In the power industry, the profit margin for generating electricity from coal is called the "clean dark spread"; at the end of December in Great Britain, it was going for about $39 per megawatt-hour, according to Argus. By contrast, the profit margin for gas-fired plants—the "clean spark spread"—was about $3. Tomas Wyns, director of the Center for Clean Air Policy-Europe, a nonprofit organization in Brussels, Belgium, said those kinds of spreads are typical across Europe right now. The EU has a cap-and-trade carbon market, the $148 billion, eight-year-old Emissions Trading System (ETS). But it's in the doldrums because of a huge oversupply of permits. That's caused the price of carbon to fall to about 4 euros ($5.23). A plan called "backloading" that would temporarily extract allowances from the market to shore up the price has faltered so far in the European Parliament. "A better carbon price could make a difference" and even out the coal and gas spreads, Wyns said. He estimates a price of between 20 and 40 euros would do the trick. "But a structural change to the Emissions Trading System is not something that will happen very quickly. A solution is years off." The Tyndall Center study estimates that the burning of all that exported coal could erase fully half the gains the United States has made in reducing carbon emissions. For huge reserves of shale gas to help cut CO2 emissions, "displaced fuels must be reduced globally and remain suppressed indefinitely," the report said. Future Emissions It is not clear that the surge in U.S. coal exports will continue. One reason for the uptick in coal-fired generation in Europe has been the looming deadline for the EU's Large Combustion Plant Directive, which will require older coal plants to meet lower emission levels by the end of 2015 or be mothballed. Before that phaseout begins, Wyns says, "there is a bit of a binge going on." Also, economic factors are at work. Tyndall's Broderick said American coal companies have been essentially selling surplus fuel overseas at low profit margins, so there is a likelihood that U.S. coal production will decrease further. The U.S. government forecasters at EIA expect that U.S. coal exports will fall back to about 110 million tons per year over the next two years, due to economic weakness in Europe, falling international prices, and competition from other coal-exporting countries. The Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) calls Europe's "coal renaissance" a temporary phenomenon; it forecasts an increasing use of renewables, shuttering of coal plants, and a better balance between gas and coal prices in the coming years. But IEA does not expect that the global appetite for coal will slacken appreciably. The agency projects that, by 2017, **coal will rival oil as the world's primary energy source**, mainly because of skyrocketing demand in Asia. U.S. coal producers have made clear that they aim to tap into that growing market.

#### Their Moniz and Tinker article says there are tons of alt causes to CO2 confinement – no well integrity standards, monitoring system, or verification protocol

Moniz and Tinker 10 – Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems @ Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the Bureau of Economic Geology @ University of Texas at Austin Ernest J. Moniz and Scott W. Tinker “Role of Enhanced Oil Recovery in Accelerating the Deployment of Carbon Capture and Sequestration,” An MIT Energy Initiative and Bureau of Economic Geology at UT Austin Symposium, July 23, 2010

A key issue for gauging the appropriateness of government support of a major EOR-CCS effort is verifiable permanence of CO2 storage. Tertiary recovery obviously implies that the reservoir has been produced through many wells over a considerable period of time. This calls into question the integrity of the CO2 confinement over centuries. Clearly, monetization of the stored CO2 will require development of both well integrity standards and an adequate and affordable monitoring system and verification protocol. Second, the EOR process entails repeated recycling of the CO2, as a substantial fraction (20% to 40%) of the injected amount can accompany the produced oil, is separated from that oil, and then reinjected. Therefore, CO2 “accounting” needs to be monitored throughout the entire operation. Further, overall system operation may be complicated by the declining demand for CO2 during a well’s EOR operating period.

Plan massively increases CO2 emissions

Romm 7 ([Rule Four of Offsets: No Enhanced Oil Recovery](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2007/08/23/201801/rule-four-of-offsets-no-enhanced-oil-recovery/), <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2007/08/23/201801/rule-four-of-offsets-no-enhanced-oil-recovery/>)

Capturing CO2 and injecting it into a well to squeeze more oil out of the ground is not real carbon sequestration. Why? When the recovered oil is burned, it releases at least as much CO2 as was stored (and possibly much more). Therefore, CO2 used for such [enhanced oil recovery](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_oil_recovery) (EOR) does not reduce net carbon emissions and should not be sold to the public as a carbon offset. Yet a company, Blue Source, LLC, proposes to do just that, to capture the CO2 from a fertilizer plant, pipe it to an oil field, and inject it into wells for EOR : [The company hopes to profit from the project by earning credits for the carbon reductions in voluntary carbon markets and by selling carbon dioxide to energy companies.](http://today.reuters.com/news/articleinvesting.aspx?type=companyNews&storyid=234545+21-Aug-2007+RTRS&WTmodLoc=InvArt-L2-CompanyNews-2) [The deal will cut CO2 from the plant by about 650,000 tonnes per year by permanently storing the emissions in the oil fields, he said. The U.S. Department of Energy says that capturing CO2 from power plants for enhanced oil recovery could greatly boost U.S. oil reserves while permanently keeping CO2 from reaching the atmosphere.](http://today.reuters.com/news/articleinvesting.aspx?type=companyNews&storyid=234545+21-Aug-2007+RTRS&WTmodLoc=InvArt-L2-CompanyNews-2) Uhh, no. To repeat, if the captured CO2 is used to extract oil that releases CO2 when it is burned, then how is that offsetting anything? The key ratio is CO2 injected vs. CO2 released from recovered oil. Fortunately, [BP and UCLA did that life-cycle analysis](http://pubs.acs.org/cgi-bin/abstract.cgi/enfuem/2001/15/i02/abs/ef000258a.html) (subs. req’d) in 2001 and concluded, “the EOR activity is almost carbon-neutral when comparing net storage potential and gasoline emissions from the additional oil extracted.” And that may be optimistic. The study notes: The results presented reflect only gasoline consumption but do not take into account the additional emissions that would originate from the refining process, nor the emissions arising from the combustion of the other products of crude oil such as diesel, bunker or jet fuels. In short, the CO2 used to recover the oil is less than the CO2 released from that oil when you include the CO2 released from 1) burning all the refined products and 2) the refining process itself. Doh! But wait. The study has a different conclusion: “utilizing captured and recycled CO2 instead of using CO2 exclusively from natural reservoirs reduces greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere from EOR.” Well, yes, most CO2 used for EOR today comes from “natural reservoirs.” But the nation and the world have barely touched the full potential of EOR even though it can potentially double the oil output from a well that has undergone primary and secondary recovery. Why? As a [Department of Energy press release](http://www.fossil.energy.gov/news/techlines/2005/tl_weyburn_mou.html) on an EOR-sequestration project noted, “much of the CO2 used in similar U.S. EOR projects has been taken at considerable expense from naturally occurring reservoirs” (tip of the hat to [The Energy Blog](http://thefraserdomain.typepad.com/energy/2005/11/co2_sequestrati.html#more) and [The Oil Drum](http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2005/12/12/18171/178), which has a good discussion of the EOR-climate issue). Cheap, widely available CO2 would be a game-changer. The DOE has studied EOR a great deal and come to an amazing conclusion. In the U.S. alone, “next generation CO2-EOR technology” and “[widespread sequestration of industrial carbon dioxide](http://www.fossil.energy.gov/news/techlines/2006/06015-Oil_Recovery_Assessments_Released.html)” could add a stunning “[160 billion barrels of domestic oil recovery](http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/eor_co2/Game_Changer_Document.pdf).” The combustion of that oil would produce more than [60 billion tonnes of CO2](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_oil_recovery), equivalent to ten times annual U.S. CO2 emissions. Nothing could be closer to genuine greenwashing then charging the public for offsets that are essentially subsidies of oil production.

**Warming is irreversible and cuts can’t solve**

**AP 9** (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's **temperature is likely to jump six degrees** between now and the end of the century **even if every country cuts** greenhouse gas **emissions** as proposed, according to a United Nations update. **Scientists looked at emission plans** from 192 nations **and calculated what would happen** to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which **aren't talking much about cutting their emissions**, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly **2 degrees** to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. **Even if the developed world cuts** its emissions by **80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half** by 2050, as some experts propose, **the world is** still **facing a 3-degree increase** by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

**Warming won’t cause extinction**

**Barrett** **‘7** professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, (Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, **climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species**.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) **will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust.** “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, **abrupt climate change** (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, **is unlikely to be ruinous.** Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

**Ocean acidification will be slow and stable, proven by 1000 studies- it improves ocean resiliency**

Codling ‘11 [Jo, received a Bachelor of Science first class and won the FH Faulding and the Swan Brewery prizes at the University of Western Australia. Her major was microbiology, molecular biology. Nova received a Graduate Certificate in Scientific Communication from the Australian National University in 1989,[4] and she did honours research in 1990, prize-winning science graduate, Jo has has done over 200 radio interviews, many on the Australian ABC.  She was formerly an associate lecturer in Science Communication at the ANU and is based in Perth, Western Australia, , “Ocean Acidification — a little bit less alkalinity could be a good thing,” Sept. 11, <http://joannenova.com.au/2011/09/ocean-acidification-a-little-bit-less-alkalinity-could-be-a-good-thing/>]

Studies of how marine life copes with less alkaline conditions include many experiments with water at pH values in a range beyond anything that is likely on planet Earth — they go beyond the bounds of what’s possible. There are estimates that the pH of the ocean has shifted about 0.1 pH unit in the last 200 years, yet some studies consider the effects of water that is shifted by 2 or even 4 entire pH units. Four pH units means 10,000 fold change in the concentration of hydrogen ions). That’s a shift so large, it’s not going to occur in the next few thousand years, even under the worst of the worst case scenarios by the most sadistic models. Indeed, it’s virtually impossible for CO2 levels to rise high enough to effect that kind of change, even if we burned every last fossil, every tree, plant microbe, and vaporized life on earth. (Yet still someone thought it was worth studying what would happen if, hypothetically, that happened. Hmm.)¶ 1103 studies on acidification say there’s no need to panic¶ CO2 science has an extraordinary data base of 1103 studies of the effects of “acidification” on marine life. They reason that any change beyond 0.5 pH units is “far far beyond the realms of reality” even if you are concerned about coral reefs in the year 2300 (see Tans 2009). Even the IPCC’s highest end “scenario A2″ estimate predicts a peak change in the range of 0.6 units by 2300.¶ Many of the headlines forecasting “Death to Reefs” come from studies of ocean water at extreme pH’s that will never occur globally, and that are beyond even what the IPCC is forecasting. Some headlines come from studies of hydrothermal vents where CO2 bubbles up from the ocean floor. Not surprisingly they find changes to marine life near the vents, but then, the pH of these areas ranges right down to 2.8. They are an extreme environment, nothing like what we might expect to convert the worlds oceans too.¶ Marine life, quite happy about a bit more CO2?¶ Studies of growth, calcification, metabolism, fertility and survival show that, actually, if things were a little less alkaline, on average, marine life would benefit. There will be winners and losers, but on the whole, using those five measures of health, the reefs are more likely to have more life on and around them, than they are to shrink.¶ Figure 12. Percent change in the five measured life characteristics (calcification, metabolism, growth, fertility and survival) vs. decline of seawater pH from its present (control treatment) value to ending values extending up to the beginning pH value of "the warped world of the IPCC" for all individual data points falling within this pH decline range.¶ How can this be?¶ First, marine life evolved under conditions where most of the time the world was warmer and had more CO2 in the atmosphere than it does today. Second, like life above the water, life-below-water is based on carbon, and putting more carbon into the water is not necessarily a bad thing. That said, the dots in the graph above represent study results, and the ones below zero tell us there will be some losers, even though there will be more winners (above zer0). Thirdly, watch out for some of the more devastating headlines which also come from studies where researchers changed the pH by tossing hydrochloric acid into the tank. Chlorine, as they say, is not the same as the gas nature breathes — CO2. (The strange thing about the studies with hydrochloric acid, is that it doesn’t seem to be bad as we might have expected– nonetheless, it seems like a dubious practice to use in studying the health of corals.)¶ The Ocean Acidification Database is housed at CO2 science.¶ The graph above is just one of many on their results and conclusions page.¶ The bottom line:¶ Yes, we should watch and monitor the oceans careful. No, there is no chance the Great Barrier Reef will be gone in the next 100 years: 1103 studies show that if the worlds oceans were **slightly less basic** then marine life as a whole will be slightly more **likely to grow, survive**, and be fertile.

**Sea level rise is junk science—models empirically fail**

**Gupta ’12** (Alexander Sen, Climate Change Research Centre @ University of New South Wales, et al., “Climate Drift in the CMIP3 Models,” Journal of Climate Vol. 25, Issue 13, p. 4621-4640, 2012)

As discussed above, drift in temperature and salinity dominates 20C3M trends throughout most of the subsurface ocean. In the calculation of steric sea level rise, a given temperature or salinity change will generally have less effect at depth than near the surface. As the amount of expansion for a given change in temperature or salinity is itself a function of temperature, salinity, and pressure (in particular warmer water expands more than colder water for the same increase in heat content), the changes in temperature near the warm surface ocean have a proportionally larger influence on steric sea level rise than temperature changes in the cold deeper ocean (at least away from the wellmixed high-latitude regions). Nevertheless, given that the global warming signal over the twentieth century is predominantly limited to the top few hundred meters, in most regions, while ocean drift extends through the entire water column, drift still introduces considerable bias into both regional and global sea level rise. The CMIP3 models show a broad range of estimates for steric sea level rise over 1950–2000 (Fig. 10a). The spread in the raw 20C3M estimates is considerable (standard deviation ;0.76 mm yr21 with a multimodel mean of 0.45 mm yr21). In addition a number of the models indicate a lowering of sea level over the period. For the drift-corrected sea level rise (i.e., by using drift corrected temperature and salinity) values become considerably more consistent (standard deviation ;0.36 mm yr21) and all models now indicate a rise in sea level. While considerable intermodel variability still exists the driftcorrected multimodel mean (;0.59 mm yr21) is consistent with the Domingues et al. (2008) observational estimate (0.526 0.08 mm yr21, for 0–700 m, 1950–2003). Figure 10a shows raw 20C3M trends and drift-corrected estimates of forced trend for steric sea level rise, including multiple ensemble members where available; ensemble members for a given model are generally initialized from the same PICNTRL experiment but from different points in time, usually separated by multiple years (Table 1). Nevertheless the drift, which is derived from different time periods from a single PICNTRL simulation, is very similar across ensemble members, suggesting that the linear drift approximation is valid and that natural variability is not having a major effect on the drift estimates. Figure 10b shows a scatter of the raw 20C3M trend magnitudes versus drift magnitudes. The drift-related error varies considerably across the models from less than 10% to over 200% for the ECHAM4 model (see previous discussion of this model). As with surface drift, subsurface drift in temperature and salinity is spatially heterogeneous and so can result in a larger bias on regional scales. This is particularly important for assessing twentieth-century regional changes, where the steric component of sea level rise is a major component of the total (e.g., Domingues et al. 2008). Figure 11 shows both the raw 20C3M and driftcorrected 1950–2000 trends for three models (calculated from the surface to the bottom). A few models (e.g., MRI-CGCM2.3.2) have a well-equilibrated preindustrial control throughout the ocean and so are essentially untroubled by drift. However, most models are significantly affected in certain regions. In fact for many models and regions the sign of the sea level trend is changed by the spurious drift. For instance in the CSIRO Mk3.0 model the steric sea level anomaly over much of the tropics and midlatitudes, estimated from the raw 20C3M temperature and salinity, changes sign once the drift is taken into account.

**No methane impact**

**Revkin ‘11**

Methane Time Bomb in Arctic Seas – Apocalypse Not -By ANDREW C. REVKIN -New york Times -December 11)

But read this summary of the paper from the American Geophysical Union, which publishes the journal, and see if you feel reassured that the “methane time bomb” there is safe for a long time to come: [T]he authors found that roughly 1 meter of the subsurface permafrost thawed in the past 25 years, adding to the 25 meters of already thawed soil. Forecasting the expected future permafrost thaw, the authors found that even under the most extreme climatic scenario tested this thawed soil growth will not exceed 10 meters by 2100 or 50 meters by the **turn of the next millennium**. The authors note that the bulk of the methane stores in the east Siberian shelf are trapped roughly **200 meters** **below** **the seafloor**… [[Read the rest.](http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2011/2011EO490014.shtml)] Here’s the link to the paper itself: “[Recent changes in shelf hydrography in the Siberian Arctic: Potential for subsea permafrost instability](http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2011/2011JC007218.shtml).” To review, the authors confirm “drastic bottom layer heating over the coastal zone” that they attribute to warming of the Arctic atmosphere, but conclude that “recent climate change cannot produce an immediate response in sub-sea permafrost.” That’s the understatement of the year considering their conclusion that even under **sustained** heating, the brunt of the **sub-sea methane won’t be affected in this millennium.**

## China

#### The conclusion of their Logan article says the squo solves U.S.-China energy cooperation – Future Gen, sequestration power plant, AP6 provides framework for future action

Logan et al. 7 – Senior associate @ World Resources Institute Logan, Joanna Lewis (Senior international fellow at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change), and Michael B. Cummings (JD candidate @ Georgetown University and former Business/Solutions Fellow @ Pew Center on Global Climate Change), “For China, the shift to climate-friendly energy depends on international collaboration,” Boston Review, January/February 2007, pg. http://bostonreview.net/BR32.1/loganlewiscummings.php

\*\*\*EMORY”S CARD BEGINS\*\*\*

All these factors combined call into question the Chinese central government’s ability to move down a different, more climate-friendly path without meaningful international engagement and assistance. It is therefore critically important for the international community to increase bilateral and multilateral collaboration with China to address shared energy and environmental concerns before it commits to half a century of carbon-intensive infrastructure. Five areas are particularly well-suited for further engagement and offer strong opportunities to expand global benefits: Energy efficiency. Efforts to improve energy efficiency are the most effective and affordable measures China can take to meet development goals while reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Continuing its tradition of relatively impressive energy-efficiency policies, China recently approved new fuel-economy standards for its rapidly growing passenger-vehicle fleet that are more stringent than those in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Moreover, the government has set an extraordinarily ambitious target of cutting energy intensity by one fifth by 2010. International partners can help China to build on these important efforts, in particular by promoting the business, financial, and regulatory skills needed for energy-efficiency projects and standards, and to reform policies that impede market-driven projects. Developing incentives for accelerated technology transfer, particularly for the private sector, are also crucial. Many of these efforts are already underway, and Chinese government officials are open to proposals that can help them meet their targets. Foreign partners need to be open and flexible so that their efforts can have maximum impact. Energy security with climate benefits. China’s booming economy has required a huge expansion in imported raw material, especially oil, since 2001. Chinese national oil companies have begun to purchase oil and gas assets around the globe as a way to increase energy security. Some nations view these actions with alarm, since there are potentially destabilizing military, political, and economic implications. From a climate perspective, China’s growing interest in coal liquefaction is also alarming because making transportation fuels from coal through chemical transformation sends approximately twice as much CO2 into the atmosphere as using standard crude oil. Better integrating China into the processes of managing the global energy system would make it a more helpful partner in managing that system. Increased participation in the IEA, G-8 and other global bodies involved in high-level energy dialogues would provide opportunities for developing shared understandings on topics affecting global energy security. Such dialogues could lead to energy-security-enhancing initiatives with climate benefits, and could lead the way toward climate-focused dialogue between the major energy consumers of the world. But any such endeavours will need to be backed by meaningful actions. China and its international partners could also discuss deeper technical collaboration on vehicle technologies, alternative fuels, and associated policies. However, any partnerships first need to focus on a dramatically improved atmosphere of trust and sincerity. Advanced coal technologies and carbon sequestration. For the past few years, China has built, on average, one new large power plant each week. Provided that it can overcome technical, financial, regulatory, and social barriers, carbon capture and storage (CCS) may become a critical option for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions from fossil-burning plants throughout the world, but especially in coal-intensive countries such as China. While China is unlikely to invest in CCS systems for coal plants in the next decade or two due to the cost, it is looking to collaborate on advanced coal technology research including coal gasification. China is also keenly interested in enhanced oil-recovery methodologies that could use carbon dioxide in the process. CO2-enhanced oil recovery can help anchor early investments in CCS infrastructure that might otherwise have to wait for a more comprehensive climate policy.

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Once more, international partnerships can help. A new U.K.-led initiative, part of the China–EU partnership on climate change, aims to accelerate experience with CCS by building a demonstration plant in the next decade. And Huaneng, China’s largest coal-based power-generation company, is one of 12 energy companies participating in the U.S. FutureGen “clean coal” project, attempting to become the world’s first integrated sequestration and hydrogen production research power plant. China is also collaborating with international partners on coal and CCS technologies through the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, known as the AP6. Officially launched in January 2006, the AP6 brings together China, the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea in an agreement based on clean energy technology cooperation. Some have criticized the AP6 as an attempt to further weaken the Kyoto Protocol, but limited funding raises doubts about whether there is enough glue to hold the membership together. The AP6 does bring together an important grouping of nations, and therefore has the potential to lay the groundwork for future action. Finally, China is a member of the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, an international initiative of 22 countries currently collaborating with the International Energy Agency to deliver recommendations to the G-8 in 2008 on how CCS can be enhanced in the near term. The Forum is opening its meetings to new participants but doesn’t yet seem to offer much interest for developing countries such as China.

#### Their Zha and Hu evidence says the plan has to do a bunch of other stuff to solve, and there are alt causes to tech transfers – have to do nuclear power, renewable energy, coal and oil production, improve energy efficiency, replace obsolete plants, and improve power price systems, urban planning, and energy conservation; IPR protection and low-cost competition alt causes

Zha and Hu 7 – Professors of International Studies @ Renmin University and Professor of Politics @ University of Hong Kong Zha Daojiong and Hu Weixing, “Promoting Energy Partnership in Beijing and Washington,” Washington Quarterly • 30:4 Autumn 2007, pp.105–115

\*\*\*EMORY’S ENTIRE CARD \*\*\*

Policy dialogues are certainly useful. Yet, as is true of so many other venues for government communication, they often result in being a means for defending one side’s own policy orientations. Partnership, on the other hand, is action oriented. Although China and the United States are not yet strategic partners in the field of energy, actions in the spirit of partnership are certainly desirable. First, Washington should continue to collaborate with Beijing on China’s energy technology development. The logic for doing so is simple: energy saved in China means an increase in worldwide supply and a reduction of pollutants into the air, which migrate across the Pacific Ocean. The areas for action include working to increase the use of nuclear and other cleaner forms of power, improving recovery rates of coal and oil production, achieving better user efficiency, and replacing technologically obsolete plants. In addition, China and the United States can benefit from discussing how to address policy issues associated with energy use such as fuel and electric power price systems, urban planning, and the encouragement of lifestyle changes to enable energy conservation. In order to promote energy technology development in China, it is essential for U.S. companies to see the benefits of participation. For U.S. and other international companies, two issues stand in the way of the transfer of energy-saving technologies to China: inadequate Chinese protection of intellectual property rights of foreign technology and low-cost competition from Chinese-made equipment. As such, transfer of the best available technologies, a frequent suggestion of Chinese government officials, is often regarded as undesirable by the U.S. business community. Energy conservation in China and environmental protection is nonetheless a matter of urgency and in the interest of the entire world. The U.S. government has sound reason to provide incentives for U.S. businesses to establish a stronger presence in China’s energy development and environmental protection. Intellectual property rights concerns are legitimate. One compromise is for U.S. technology companies to partner with their Chinese counterparts to produce better-than-available (though not the most high-end) energy technologies and equipments for adoption in China. This approach can establish intellectual property rights protection within the Chinese system from the start, with Chinese partners having an interest in protecting their own investments. As for concerns about competition from cheaper Chinese-made energy-saving technologies, energy conservation is a worldwide task. Such competition thus ought to be viewed as a benign if not welcome development. Second, the governments of China and the United States ought to explore ways for their energy companies to jointly enlarge the global supply of oil and other forms of energy. Chinese oil companies are already collaborating with U.S. and other international oil companies through subcontracting arrangements. Serious competition between Chinese and U.S. companies as well as other international oil companies takes place when they pursue wholly owned or equity investment in the same asset in a third country. Chinese oil investment decisions baffle their U.S. competitors when profit margins are estimated to be considerably lower than those of other companies, raising suspicions of political motives. When Beijing and Washington are viewed as condoning such company behavior through diplomacy, they inadverdently help strengthen the leverage of the third country, increasing the cost of extraction for all. Rather than providing cover for each other’s energy companies to compete in third-country markets, the two governments should find ways to encourage joint ventures in oil extraction. Chinese-U.S. joint ventures in oil development could help to lower the costs for oil companies associated with competitive bidding for the same energy assets. They would also help dissuade the appeal of resource nationalism to oil-exporting states. This approach can certainly contribute to confidence building between the political establishments in Beijing and Washington. Energy security as a bilateral issue between China and the United States has the potential to become contentious. Although energy has little chance of being the issue that diffuses the myriad tensions between Beijing and Washington, energy cooperation in the spirit of partnership can help improve the status quo.

**Multiple barriers ensure energy cooperation fails and undermines cooperation**

**Segal ‘9** (The G-2 Mirage. By: Economy, Elizabeth C., Segal, Adam, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, May/Jun2009, Vol. 88, Issue 3 By Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal Elizabeth C. Economy is C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Adam Segal is Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

But elevating the bilateral **relationship** is not the solution. It **will raise expectations for a level of partnership** that **cannot be met and exacerbate the very real differences that still exist** between Washington and Beijing. The current lack of U.S.-Chinese **cooperation does not stem from** a **failure on Washington's part** to recognize how much China matters, nor is it the result of leaders ignoring the bilateral relationship. It derives from **mismatched interests, values, and capabilities**. The United States must accordingly resist the temptation to initiate a high-profile, high-stakes bilateral dialogue and instead embrace a far more flexible, multilateral approach to China. In other words, Obama should continue to work with China in order to address global problems, but he also needs to enlist the world to deal with the problems created by the rise of China. The good news is that the United States and China do share some fundamental foreign policy goals: kickstarting economic growth and maintaining an open global economy, maintaining peace and stability in East Asia, and halting climate change. There is already a robust process of government-to-government exchange, with more than 60 bilateral dialogues and working groups in existence, including the Strategic Economic Dialogue, the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue, and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks. The United States and China have cooperated on counterterrorism, negotiated with North Korea through the six-party talks, and undertaken joint research on alternative energy. Recently, the Pentagon welcomed the deployment of the Chinese navy for antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, where both the United States and China depend on the same shipping lanes. Recognition of China's importance, however, cannot paper over the difficulties the two countries have faced--and will continue to face--as they try to convert shared strategic goals into concrete cooperation. Even after 30 years of engagement, the United States and China still disagree about how the world should work. When there is agreement on the principles of global governance, more narrow economic interests or differences in political values typically make a common front elusive. And even when shared values and interests allow the two sides to move forward, the **vast gap in governance and implementation capabilities** often **leads to mutual frustration and recriminations**. THE GREAT STALL A SIGNIFICANT obstacle to effective U.S.-Chinese cooperation is the dramatically different view of sovereignty, sanctions, and the use of force that each country brings to the table. Beijing's need for resources and export markets, along with its oft-repeated mantra of not mixing business with politics, clashes with the West's efforts to prevent human rights abuses and improve governance in the developing world. For example, Chinese state-owned companies have vast resource holdings and development interests in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Myanmar (also called Burma), where human rights abuses and problems of poor governance are rampant. Likewise, China's refusal to stop its growing arms trade has contributed to instability in Sudan and Zimbabwe, even as the rest of the world has urged restraint in weapons sales to those nations. Yet Beijing repeatedly refuses to exert its economic leverage for political ends, arguing that the political and economic realms should remain separate. Although Washington and Beijing share some common interests in Darfur, Myanmar, and other regions in which serious human rights violations are occurring, their opposing perspectives on sovereignty and humanitarian intervention lead to very different policy prescriptions. In September 2007, for example, Beijing, along with Moscow, blocked a UN Security Council resolution sponsored by the United States and Europe that forcefully condemned the Myanmar government for the use of force against Buddhist monks who were leading antigovernment protests. China, which has strong political ties to Myanmar's rulers and large investments in oil and gas projects in the country, insisted that the crackdown was an internal affair, called for restraint, and finally voted for a much-watered-down resolution. Beijing's growing dependence on imported oil and gas has also been an obstacle to broader U.S.-Chinese cooperation on limiting Iran's nuclear program. China has generally rejected calls for tough sanctions against Iran and undermined efforts by the United States and Europe to stop the flow of Iranian money through foreign banks. As Iran's trade with the European Union (EU) has declined, it has picked up with China. In addition, China's authoritarian but decentralized political and economic system also makes cooperation on issues such as product safety and environmental protection difficult. Beijing is often incapable of following through on its international obligations because local actors have strong economic incentives to maintain the status quo. Even when the central government has the best intentions, a lack of transparency and accountability further undermines the implementation of laws. Over the past several years, for example, China's food- and product-safety records have come under increasing international scrutiny. China's vast exports ensure that almost no country goes unaffected when tainted pet food, toothpaste, dairy products, toys, or pharmaceutical ingredients are released onto the market. These poisonous products have entered the EU, Japan, Panama, the United States, and Vietnam--to name just a few. Efforts to address China's ongoing problems in the realm of food and product safety are hampered not only by bureaucracies with weak oversight capacity but also by a government that refuses to permit the media and on-the-ground watchdogs to investigate and warn the general public. Reporters from Southern Weekend and the Oriental Morning Post knew two months before the story became public, in September 2008, that melamine--a chemical that suppliers were adding to low-quality dairy products in order raise the protein level and pass inspections-- had sickened children. But they were prohibited from reporting the news, in order to ensure a positive atmosphere for the Olympics. Although the press, bloggers, and nongovernmental organizations are becoming increasingly assertive, they are unable to act consistently as a check on local officials due to censorship and political harassment. Cooperation on climate change **may prove even more challenging**. As Washington weighs the value of pursuing a bilateral climate deal with China, Beijing's ability to enforce regulations will be called into question. Effective climate policy depends on transparency in reporting emissions, yet in the run-up to the Olympics, Beijing's published air-pollution index did not include two of the most dangerous pollutants: ozone and small particulate matter. A bilateral climate deal would also **necessitate large-scale transfers of energy**-related technologies, such as advanced materials for wind turbines, from the United States to China. However, **China lacks the legal infrastructure needed to enforce intellectual property** rights**--a weakness that will worry the** European, Japanese, and U.S. **firms that design new green technologies**. **Even basic policy initiatives**, such as the implementation of energy-efficient building codes, **require a degree of enforcement capacity and official accountability that does not exist** within the Chinese government.

**US China CCS cooperation trades off with Japan coop- that solves the aff better**

**Segal ‘9** (The G-2 Mirage. By: Economy, Elizabeth C., Segal, Adam, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, May/Jun2009, Vol. 88, Issue 3 By Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal Elizabeth C. Economy is C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Adam Segal is Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Despite insistent calls for a bilateral U.S.-Chinese effort to address climate change, **cooperation would be managed best by** involving **other nations.** The United States and China are the two largest emitters of carbon dioxide, and each is using the other as an excuse for inaction. China is currently calling for all the advanced industrialized nations to devote one percent of their GDPs to a climate fund for developing countries--a mechanism that would subsidize the transfer of clean-energy technologies to Beijing. The United States simply does not have the financial resources available to respond to this challenge. Meanwhile, Japan is pursuing a **different tack** and has **already started to provide** development **assistance** to China **for clean-energy** projects thanks to its **highly sophisticated public-private partnerships** that provide government financing for privately held Japanese technology companies. **Beijing and Tokyo are moving ahead with** technical cooperation and demonstration **projects to capture and store carbon,** enhance energy efficiency, and exploit renewable energy resources. It makes sense for the United States to duplicate some of these efforts. After all, China is a large country, and there will always be unmet demand. In addition, the United States has a comparative advantage when it comes to training Chinese officials, monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, and designing some clean-energy technologies. But Washington does not want to undermine European and **Japanese efforts by competing to cooperate with China**. There is frequently a cost to cooperating with Beijing: Chinese government agencies often require donations or impose high overhead costs on foreign partners, and these fees could well rise as the Chinese play foreign actors off against one another. Moreover, **Chinese energy** and environmental **agencies are woefully understaffed and often unable to meet the demands of in-depth cooperation with a number of different partners**. There is also a very real danger that U.S. officials will raise expectations within China but fail to deliver if, for example, the U.S. government does not provide adequate funding for demonstration projects or training programs, as has happened with past cooperative energy and environmental ventures.

#### The conclusion of their Herberg article says new multilateral institutions and regional power cooperation are key, not just oil

Herberg 11 - Senior Lecturer of International Relations and Pacific Studies @ University of California–San Diego Dr. Mikkal E. Herberg (Research Director on Asian energy security at the National Bureau of Asian Research), “China’s Energy Rise and the Future of U.S.-China Energy Relations,” New America Foundation, June 21, 2011 |pg. http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china\_s\_energy\_rise\_and\_the\_future\_of\_us\_china\_energy\_relations

\*\*\*EMORY”S CARD BEGINS\*\*\*

Competing Visions of Energy Security On the vexing challenge of energy security there remains a major contradiction between the common energy security challenge that the U.S. and China both face and the deeply divergent approach that each takes toward the challenge. The inability to work together on this common problem concedes the advantage to producer governments who can take advantage of the fractious and uncoordinated response of the two largest oil importers to their anxieties over reliable supplies of crude oil. The common problem is clear: as the two largest oil consumers and importers China and the U.S. have a fundamental common interest in working together to find ways to boost global oil production, strengthen investment in new oil supplies, to encourage an increasingly diversified geographic spread of new oil suppliers, to strengthen the security of sea lanes and critical transport bottlenecks around the globe, and to collaborate in building strategic oil stocks and coordination mechanisms in the case of major oil supply disruptions which are virtually inevitable over time. Global oil markets are tightening and prices are rising well above $100 a barrel and are likely to continue rising as demand increasingly bumps up against a structurally weak global oil supply picture. Both countries are by far the most exposed to the increasing costs and worsening reliability of global oil supplies. These mutual interests are so profoundly obvious that the lack of collaboration on this between the two governments is frankly stunning. The lack of coordination between the two leviathans of the oil market leaves their energy security to the tender mercies of a chronically unstable global oil market and a group of politically unstable, often corrupt, economically mismanaged, and increasingly geographically concentrated group of oil exporters that are quite happy to exploit this to increase revenues. Beyond the different prisms through which each leadership sees energy security, other aspects of each’s current approach to energy security further reduce the potential for working together. The U.S. Obama administration lacks any serious, near or medium-term strategy on oil and energy security and isn’t philosophically or organizationally inclined to seek a more active global energy security strategy that would engage China and other major importers at a high level. The Obama administration came to office with a laudable “green” energy agenda of accelerating renewable energy development and, relevant to the oil side of the equation, accelerating development of electric vehicles and battery technology. Its vision of energy security is to move away from oil, coal, and traditional fossil fuels toward more reliable, domestically-produced green energy technologies. It launched the Major Economies Forum for Energy and Climate in mid-2009 which tackles climate change and clean energy cooperation multilaterally in a group of 17 major economies. Unfortunately, the green revolution will take at least 20 years to make any serious difference in the need for oil and reduce the importance of global oil market stability. When the administration does talk about more near and medium-term energy and oil security, it remains mired in the domestic dialogue of “energy independence” and professes an aim of reducing dependence on imported oil and completely eliminating imports of Middle East and Venezuelan oil. In the next 20 years, this is simply not a serious strategy given how central imported oil will remain to U.S. transportation needs and economic prosperity. But there doesn’t seem to be an appetite in the Obama administration for an activist global energy security strategy at the leadership level that could potentially enlist a stronger sense of common purpose and collaboration with China. On Beijing’s side, there are also added constraints on the potential to collaborate. Beijing’s political leadership sees energy security in terms of national, physical control of overseas oil supplies owned or controlled by China’s NOCs and control of pipeline infrastructure and sea lanes bringing supplies directly to China. But China’s approach is mercantilist in deeper ways that help explain the persistence of an energy security policy that is inadequate to meet China’s real global energy security dilemma. China’s oil import needs are rising at three times the rate that its NOCs can acquire or develop new overseas producing assets.8 Most of their overseas production is not exported back to China rather it is sold into local and regional markets to benefit from the best available netback value of their production, just like other international oil companies. For a whole range of reasons the benefit of nationally controlled oil supplies perceived by China’s leadership as a form of energy security isn’t really effective in the real global oil industry of today. This raises the question of how to explain the persistence of leadership beliefs in the NOC-based energy security strategy? The answer is that what appears to be a mercantilist energy security strategy has gradually evolved into what is, in reality, a mercantilist industrial policy aimed at building oil industry “national champions”. This is a key distinction between leadership perception and oil industry reality. The Chinese political leadership seems to believe that its state support for the expansion of its NOCs abroad is ensuring or “locking up” more secure future oil supplies for China. However, in practice China’s NOCs are investing and operating largely driven by the same commercial, competitive, and global oil market imperatives as the IOCs.9 Ironically, this is linking China’s oil security ever more closely to global oil market supply, demand, and price conditions rather than directly ensuring national physical control of sufficient future oil supplies to meet rising demand. Where the leadership’s perceptions and the commercial interests of the NOCs do converge is the extensive direct political and financial support Beijing provides their NOCs to get ahead, i.e. to “catch-up”, in the highly competitive global oil industry. To outside observers and oil company competitors this collaboration, whether state or NOC-led, has all the markings of “China Energy, Inc.” Nevertheless, what the leadership perceives as an energy security policy is, in practice, more an outcome of Beijing’s reflexive reliance on industrial policies and strong state support to build global national champions, as it does in other industrial sectors, from vehicles to the electronics industry to clean energy to the nuclear industry. The persistence of this approach is reinforced by other industries and bureaucracies which have learned to use the language of energy security to promote state support for their own global competitive advantage. For example, the Chinese tanker/shipbuilding industry has convinced the leadership that Chinese oil and natural gas imports will be more secure if carried on Chinese tankers, therefore justifying subsidies and cheap loans.10 As Erica Downs suggests in an excellent recent Brookings report, the China Development Bank (CDB) has strong converging interests with China’s NOCs insofar as large loans to support NOC overseas investments and loans to secure long-term oil and gas supply arrangements from key exporters like Russia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, and others, all handled through China’s NOCs, provides the CDB with badly needed credit-worthy opportunities to lend out its huge hoard of Chinese state foreign assets.11 The PLA Navy (PLAN) has also begun to cast security of China’s energy sea lanes as an increasingly vital PLAN mission helping to promote growing budgets. In some cases even provincial governments have employed the language of energy security to help promote provincial economic development, such as Yunnan’s promotion of an oil import pipeline across Myanmar, which in reality was mainly aimed at boosting Yunnan’s provincial economy.12 This suggests that the prevailing NOC-based, mercantilist character of China’s energy security policies is more deeply rooted than commonly understood. It is industrial policy masquerading as an energy security strategy. And a wide range of important industrial, financial, and bureaucratic interests have a stake in continuing along this path. Consequently, it’s not surprising that even as Beijing builds its own strategic oil stocks for national use, it has shown little interest in joining in the International Energy Agency’s emergency oil stocks program and becoming entangled in the IEA’s rather tortuous multilateral consultation process over releases of strategic oil stocks. Combined with the lack of engagement on global energy security strategic diplomacy in the Obama administration this suggests that forging a common U.S.-China working consensus at the leadership level on their common multilateral energy security challenges is likely to remain elusive. Despite these divergent interests and poor atmospherics, there have been at least a few signs that progress on a more cooperative, “win-win” approach to energy security and investment is possible. For example, the toxic outcome of the CNOOC-Unocal debacle in 2005 strongly reinforced Beijing’s suspicions that the U.S. viewed oil security and investment as an arena of strategic competition between the U.S. and China and convinced Chinese NOCs that they were not welcome in the U.S. oil patch. China’s NOCs have since avoided seeking any new investments here. Recently, however, CNOOC invested in two large tracts of U.S. shale gas properties in a joint venture with Chesapeake Energy. Shale gas development is a huge and booming sector of the U.S. energy industry and CNOOC clearly would like to acquire the know-how of shale gas development to take back to China. CNOOC was able to make those investments with virtually no reaction in Washington DC which suggests that some of the political hysteria on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in Washington DC about investments by Chinese state-owned NOCs may be easing. It would not be surprising to see other Chinese NOCs following CNOOC’s lead in the U.S. which could help further ease nationalistic concerns over the aims of the Chinese companies. The Challenge of Energy and Regional Diplomacy: Beijing’s energy security drive is accelerating its emergence as a regional and global power. With expanding investments, oil import and LNG supply deals, and active pipeline diplomacy, China will inevitably become a key diplomatic and economic player in virtually every major oil and gas-exporting region of the world. Historian Niall Ferguson talks about this as China’s evolution towards an “inadvertent” empire.13 As its presence and interests in these areas expands China also will increasingly begin to occupy strategic space that has traditionally been dominated by the U.S. From the Persian Gulf to Central Asia to Southeast Asia and Latin America, U.S. and Chinese energy and strategic interests will more and more often bump up against one another. Also, Beijing’s concerns about its growing dependence on seaborne oil and gas imports through the Indian Ocean, Malacca Straits, and South China Sea are contributing to its rapid and substantial naval modernization which also raises new issues in the face of the traditional dominance of the U.S. navy in the Pacific. Ultimately, as the two largest oil importers in the world, the U.S. and China have a strong mutual interest in stability in key energy exporting regions and in the free transit of energy resources. However, this has generally been insufficient to galvanize much agreement on regional policies and influence and, in fact China’s growing presence in these areas of traditional U.S. strategic, energy, and maritime power has aggravated the sense of strategic rivalry on both sides. This growing potential for conflict needs to be acknowledged and will need to be managed carefully. Iran is an example of how China’s widening energy footprint can complicate bilateral relations. Iran has become a key oil supplier to China and also a potential source of major new oil and gas investments for China’s NOCs. The U.S. believes that China’s long-running reluctance to support tightening U.S.-led UN sanctions on Iran reflect its growing energy relationship with Iran. Indeed, at each step of tightening sanctions China has worked to limit the sanctions in a way that China’s NOCs can continue to invest in the oil industry and can also continue to supply oil products to Iran which is heavily dependent on imported oil products. Many in Beijing, alternatively, believe that the U.S. is cynically trying to deny China access to vital oil supplies that it needs to fuel economic growth. Although China has gradually come along on increasing sanctions on Iran, it remains the key opponent on the Security Council of more effective sanctions and, moreover, its NOCs are positioned for potentially much larger oil and gas investments in Iran. This issue remains a key irritant in U.S.-China relations.14 Nevertheless, even in the case of Iran, creative diplomacy can potentially help reduce friction and reinforce our common energy security interests in stabilizing oil and gas exports from the region. During 2010, as oil prices continued to rise, the U.S. sought Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) support in an effort to convince Beijing that the Saudis and GCC producers could supply China’s oil needs, a move to encourage China to limit its crude oil purchases from Iran.15 This suggests a more nuanced U.S. recognition of China’s energy security concerns and a search for a more integrated and common approach to our mutual energy security interests in the region. As China’s energy footprint grows, distrust over energy intentions and investments are likely to increasingly affect new areas where both the U.S. and China have vital strategic interests. In Southeast Asia and the South China Sea region access to energy resources and control of the increasingly vital energy sea lanes of the Malacca Straits and South China Sea China have become important dimensions of U.S.-China regional diplomacy. China’s NOCs have growing energy investments in Indonesia, Australia, Myanmar, and elsewhere in the region and Beijing also has staked historic claims to sovereign control of a vast and contested maritime space across the South China Sea that it believes holds large oil and gas resources. Also, 80% of China’s imported oil and a growing share of its natural gas imports are transported by tanker through these sea lanes and these volumes are destined to rise dramatically over the next decade. Hence, energy security has become another dimension of China’s regional strategic calculus of strengthening its influence in the region, enforcing its sovereignty claims in disputed areas like the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and exerting greater strategic influence over shipping and the sea lanes. This has contributed to significantly more assertive actions recently by Beijing in the region in pressing its sovereignty claims. The Chinese also reacted with a virtual diplomatic tantrum when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at a recent ASEAN meeting that the U.S. was interested in helping broker a resolution of regional maritime claims. The Chinese have also become increasing active in harassing U.S. naval activities along China’s coast, such as the recent episode of harassing the U.S. Impeccable naval vessel. In Northeast Asia, as well, energy has become an important irritant in China’s relations with Japan as they joust over a natural gas field in the East China Sea. Further from China’s regional heartland, in Central Asia China’s large and growing energy investments and oil and gas supply pipelines are key elements of its rapidly growing strategic and economic presence in the region. China now accounts for 25% of Kazakhstan’s oil production, has built a large oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, has built a large natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, and is developing another gas pipeline from Kazakhstan. At the same time, the U.S. has been a key player since the fall of the Soviet Union in the energy geopolitics of the Caspian region and has invested much political capital and diplomatic effort to encourage the construction of oil and gas pipelines toward the west and free of Russian influence. This creates an increasingly delicate balance. On the one hand, to the extent China’s growing access to Central Asian energy undermines Russia’s traditional dominance there, this suits U.S. interests. Nevertheless, China’s growing influence is also coming at the expense of U.S. influence over future energy flows and investments in the region. For example, China’s growing access to Turkmenistan’s natural gas supplies to move them east to China effectively weakens the rationale for a large gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the west and on to Europe, the so-called Nabucco Pipeline project, which the U.S. strongly supports. Even potentially more problematic, Iran’s oil and gas supplies could at some future point move by pipeline across Central Asia to China if China were to promote such a plan. Hence, energy is now an important factor in how the U.S. and China view each other’s role in the region, a factor that geographically and economically increasingly favors China. China’s energy engagement is leading to a range of concerns for the U.S. over its regional influence in a number of key places. In the Persian Gulf, the traditional heart of U.S. energy and strategic presence, China is rapidly becoming a key player beyond its ongoing involvement in Iran. The U.S.-Saudi strategic alliance has been the cornerstone of U.S. energy security strategy for decades. However, China-Saudi relations are booming as the Saudis have become the largest single oil import supplier to China, now regularly accounting for 20% of China’s oil imports. In a highly symbolic sign of the changing times, in early 2010 for some months the Saudis exported more oil to China than to the U.S. something that would have been thought nearly impossible just a few years earlier. China’s NOCs were the largest investors in Iraq’s massive oil field development auctions snagging three very large deals. In Africa much has been written about U.S. concerns over China’s enormous new energy and resource investments and the expansion in Chinese diplomatic and economic influence. This is growing as China’s NOCs become increasingly active in West Africa’s prolific offshore oil fields in Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea traditionally dominated by U.S. and western oil companies. In Latin America, China’s booming energy ties with Venezuela and more recently Brazil’s offshore oil bonanza have created new concerns in Washington over the potential erosion of U.S. influence in the region. Even in Canada, China’s NOCs are becoming significant investors in western Canada’s heavy oil and natural gas business. There is growing conversation in Washington that China’s efforts to develop oil and gas pipelines to Canada’s west coast for shipping to China could undermine a key, secure energy supply source to the U.S. Hence, while official U.S. policy tends to focus on our common energy interests in secure oil and gas supplies, under the surface U.S. apprehension is growing over the long-term implications of China’s growing energy footprint. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton let on to this growing anxiety inadvertently in recent Congressional testimony. In defending the need for more funding to defend U.S. interests abroad she blurted out the example of China’s efforts to undermine ExxonMobil’s large liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Papua New Guinea and its widening energy and diplomatic impact. “We are in a competition with China…..ExxonMobil is producing it. China is in there every day, in every way trying to figure out how it’s going to come in behind us, come in under us…..if anybody thinks that our retreating on these issues is somehow going to be irrelevant to the maintenance of our leadership in a world where we are competing with China, where we are competing with Iran, that is a mistaken notion.” 16 China’s energy reach will inevitably continue to expand and with it the potential for increasing tensions and competition for influence in the key oil and gas producing regions of the world. This has only just begun. It will take strong leadership in both Beijing and Washington to avoid energy becoming a major source of tension in an already complex bilateral relationship. The Carbon, Climate Change Divide Another area where U.S.-China cooperation is central to addressing a critical global energy challenge is in the arena of climate change and carbon emissions. It is perhaps the best example of how the U.S. and China are reluctantly but increasingly joined-at-the-hip as the two indispensible energy powers necessary to meet these global challenges. Unfortunately, the prospects for reaching common ground remain poor. In the wake of the disappointing outcome of the UN Copenhagen climate meetings in December 2009 which clearly exposed the deep rift between China and the U.S., progress on re-energizing the UN climate process has been glacially slow. While the complexity of the UN climate negotiating process itself makes progress very difficult, the core problem remains the same, namely the inability of the two largest emitters to come to any consensus on their respective responsibilities for the future. The recent follow-up meeting in Cancun at the end of 2010 was barely able to forge a reaffirmation of the basic agenda set by the Copenhagen Accord, itself a vague and incomplete outline. China continues to lead the developing countries in seeking a new pact that continues the existing Kyoto Protocol approach of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and places the onus for solutions largely on the rich countries, most importantly the U.S. The U.S., along with most of the other rich countries are seeking a whole new pact that would broaden responsibility and require the developing countries to agree to specific national commitments for carbon emission reductions, taking into account national circumstances. Beneath the dispute lies the fundamental divide which remains largely unbridged between the two groups of countries over historic and future responsibilities. As by far the two largest emitters, the U.S. and China are central to future progress. But there remains little common ground between the two and their national approaches are increasingly at odds. The U.S. is unable to forge any domestic consensus on its responsibilities. The Obama administration’s ambitious approach to climate change suffered from the debacle at Copenhagen, but in any event the lack of domestic support for a more active U.S. climate policy was already clear and has only intensified with the rightward shift in U.S. politics in the wake of the financial crisis and the November 2010 Congressional elections. Even the Obama effort to employ the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to impose emission reductions is under assault politically. The lack of consensus domestically fatally undermines U.S. credibility in global talks and, in particular, undermines U.S. hectoring of China over its emissions. The lack of U.S. credibility allows China, which is moving nationally on a much more significant scale to slow the rise in its emissions, to take the moral high ground. Some may argue that a global agreement is unlikely because of the complexity of the negotiations globally, the multitude of conflicting interests and voices, and the continuing questions about the science. That may be. But what is clear is that if there were to be any chance for more progress on global climate negotiations, it will require a stronger consensus between the U.S. and China over their respective responsibilities. Without that, real progress remains impossible. Conclusion Stronger cooperation between China and the U.S. on global energy issues is vital to addressing our key global energy challenges, most importantly our common energy security dilemma. Without a greater willingness to work together on these issues, we are likely to face more unstable and high-priced oil markets, weaker global institutions to address energy market instability, an increasingly competitive and conflict-prone strategic environment in key energy exporting regions, and frightening carbon and climate outcomes. The issue is not cooperation on better U.S.-China relations for its own sake but cooperation that addresses our vital and common interests in energy security on a global basis. Is this possible? There is a long list of possible efforts to improve the scale and quality of U.S.-China energy cooperation. First, there is no serious strategic energy bilateral dialogue and one is desperately needed. The SAED is not up to the task, it is too burdened with a multitude of economic and other issues. The U.S. and China need to begin a semi-annual strategic discussion on common energy interests and develop new rules of the road and understandings about their respective interests in and views on key energy exporting regions. There is a desperate need for a confidence-building process. Part of this is to agree that we will disagree on many issues and try to prevent them from becoming toxic in the larger relationship. An important part of this dialogue is to work to contain the atmosphere of national competition over energy supplies and reshape it towards an acceptance of aggressive commercial competition in a broader context of national cooperation where we have broader mutual energy security interests. In order to fashion an effective dialogue, the Obama administration needs to craft a serious and actionable energy security strategy that focuses on near and medium term realities. The green agenda is a 20 year journey in terms of oil and energy security, the U.S. needs a strategy for the next 5-10 years of continuing vulnerability to a chronically unreliable and unstable global oil market. This should involve a “full-court-press”, together with China, on the producer states to open up oil resources to greater access from international companies and faster development of easily-accessed, low-cost reserves. On China’s part, Beijing needs to abandon its ineffective and counter-productive equity ownership driven model of energy security and cut its NOCs loose to let them compete and prosper. Supporting their oil field acquisitions does not strengthen China’s energy security and these companies no longer need the help given high oil prices and their growing competitive and technological sophistication. State support of their NOCs is increasingly a crude industrial policy of promoting “national champions” while at the same time aggravating energy security fears and distrust of key nearby powers.

\*\*\*EMORY”S CARD ENDS\*\*\*

Moreover, new multilateral institutions for energy security are needed; the IEA no longer represents the interests or the distribution of power among all the major oil importers. A modest start could be to start a Northeast Asian Energy Forum that **would bring together** the major oil **and gas** importers in the region. Regional cooperation on establishing emergency oil stocks would be an excellent approach to promote a more cooperative atmosphere. There was a forum to focus on energy security convened in 2006 by China that included all they key regional players including the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Russia, and India. This needs to be revived and reinvigorated.

**No Senkaku or Asian conflict-** empirically denied, economic interdependence checks, and China avoids nationalism

**Carlson ’2-21-13** (Allen Carlson is an Associate Professor in Cornell University’s Government Department. He was granted his PhD from Yale University’s Political Science Department. His undergraduate degree is from Colby College. In 2005 his Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era was published by Stanford University Press. He has also written articles that appeared in the Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Affairs, Asia Policy, and Nations and Nationalism. In addition, he has published monographs for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the East-West Center Washington. Carlson was a Fulbright-Hays scholar at Peking University during the 2004-2005 academic year. In 2005 he was chosen to participate in the National Committee’s Public Intellectuals Program, and he currently serves as an adviser to Cornell’s China Asia Pacific Studies program and its East Asia Program. Carlson is currently working on a project exploring the issue of nontraditional security in China’s emerging relationship with the rest of the international system. His most recent publications are the co-edited Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods and Field Strategies (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and New Frontiers in China’s Foreign Relations (Lexington, 2011). China Keeps the Peace at Sea China Keeps the Peace at Sea Why the Dragon Doesn't Want War Allen Carlson February 21, 2013

At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the **Senkaku** (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. **Yet,** months later, **nothing has happened**. And **despite** their **aggressive posturing** in the disputed territory, **both** sides **now show** glimmers of **willingness to** dial down hostilities and to **reestablish stability.** Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the **roots of the conflict -- and** the **reasons it has not** yet **exploded -- are much deeper**. Put simply, **China cannot afford** military **conflict with any** of its **Asian neighbors.** It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However**, Chinese officials see** that **even the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by** the **collateral damage** that such a use of force would cause **to Beijing's two most fundamental national interests --** economic **growth and preventing the escalation of** radical **nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep** Xi Jinping, **China's new leader, from** authorizing the use of deadly **force** in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over **three decades**, **Beijing has promoted** peace and **stability in Asia** to facilitate conditions amenable to **China's** **economic** **development**. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, **although** often seen as **a promoter of conflict**, **further limits the prospects for armed engagement**. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. **Ever since** the **Tiananmen Square** massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, **successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance** between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it **cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks** in the sea. On the contrary, in the **coming months it will quietly** seek a way to **shelve the dispute in return for** securing **regional stability**, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. **The ensuing peace**, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, **will be enduring.**

**No risk of Chinese maritime disputes**

**Fravel ’12** (M. TAYLOR FRAVEL is an associate professor of political science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All Quiet in the South China Sea Why China is Playing Nice (For Now) M. Taylor Fravel March 22, 2012

Little noticed, however, has been **China's recent adoption of a** new -- and **much more moderate -- approach**. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to **restore China's** tarnished **image** in East Asia and to **reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role** there. The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit **paved the way for** an **agreement** in July 2011 **between China and** the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (**ASEAN**) **to finally implement a** declaration of a **code of conduct** they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes." **Since the summer, senior Chinese** officials, especially **top political leaders** such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have **repeatedly reaffirmed** the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's **maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation** while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas." **Authoritative Chinese-**language **media,** too**,** has begun to **underscore the importance of cooperation.** Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies. **In terms** of actually **setting aside disputes, China has made progress**. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands. China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. **The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is** probably **more than just a** mere **stalling tactic**. Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also **halted** many of the more **assertive behaviors** that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, **its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor**. The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? **More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests**. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship. **By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached**. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region. So far, **Beijing's new approach seems to be working**, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

**No US-China war**

**Rosecrance et al ‘10** (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>)

**Will China and the US Go to War?** If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “**no**,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, **China has** gradually **accepted the US-**led **world** order **and become a status quo power.** It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, **China** has **clearly rejected** the option of **territorial expansion.** It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, **it has been trying to settle** its border **disputes through negotiation**. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, **even on** the question of **Taiwan**, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, **it has adopted** a policy of **peaceful reunification**. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, **China has relied on trade** and investment **for** national welfare and **prestige, instead of** military **conquest.** And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that **it** really **sees no other option than** to continue on **this path to prosperity**. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. **There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns** on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

**No cooperation and no conflict—structural issues overwhelm**

**Harding ’11** (Harry Harding 11, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html

In my judgment, **it is highly unlikely for** the relationship between **the US and China to be** primarily **cooperative**, at least in the short to medium term. **The differences in values,** political **systems, interests,** levels of **development, and perceptions** of the existing international order **are simply too great** for the two countries to find common ground on all issues, or **even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to pursue common interests**. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately**, an essentially confrontational relationship is** also **unlikely**, especially if one is primarily concernedwith the risks of military conflict. The high degree of economic **interdependence** between the two countries **has** already **created a relatively resilient relationship**. The **cost of** military **conflict**, especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, **will be a significant deterrent** against military conflict. Equally important, the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan – is presently quite low, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.

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### AT: Brugado

#### Solves China – tax credits still spur tech which solves the cooperation internal link


Logan et al. 07 – Senior associate @ World Resources Institute [Logan, Joanna Lewis (Senior international fellow at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change), and Michael B. Cummings (JD candidate @ Georgetown University and former Business/Solutions Fellow @ Pew Center on Global Climate Change), “For China, the shift to climate-friendly energy depends on international collaboration,” Boston Review, January/February 2007, pg. http://bostonreview.net/BR32.1/loganlewiscummings.php]

Developing incentives for accelerated technology transfer, particularly for the private sector, are also crucial. Many of these efforts are already underway, and Chinese government officials are open to proposals

#### CP sufficiently solves the aff – federal oil only accounts for 7 percent of oil

Goad 3/6 (*Jessica is the Manager of Research and Outreach for the Public Lands Project at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.*[Despite Industry Efforts To Blame Administration, There’s A Geologic Reason Most Drilling Occurs On Nonfederal Lands](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/03/06/1677051/geology-drilling-public-land/) http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/03/06/1677051/geology-drilling-public-land/)

But a new report released today by the Denver-based Center for Western Priorities called “[Follow the Oil](http://westernpriorities.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CFWPreport_030513_v9.pdf)” shows that putting the blame on the president and his administration is nothing more than conservative messaging. Much of today’s boom in oil and natural gas is from unconventional [shale “plays,”](http://geology.com/rocks/shale.shtml) areas that have only recently been opened through new technology. And, as the report notes: Nationwide, 90 percent of all current shale gas plays exist on nonfederal lands, with only 10 percent located on federal lands. Even starker, almost all shale oil resources exist on non-federal lands. Only 7 percent of current shale oil and mixed plays are found on federally-owned lands with the remaining 93 percent on nonfederal lands. This map shows what those findings look like across the country, and where the industry is “following the oil”:



Additionally, economics are playing a role in driving drilling from public lands to nonfederal lands. As the report states, “rapid development increased the supply of natural gas, driving down prices, and sending companies searching for other drilling locations and revenue sources.” In other words, the oil and gas industry has met the enemy, and it is itself. The release of this report comes at a very opportune time, considering that Sally Jewell, nominee to be the next Secretary of the Interior, will have her [confirmation hearing](http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings-and-business-meetings?ID=75010617-43f1-462e-8858-3a4ee100315e) in front of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee this week And as expected, key members of the committee are preparing to ask her questions about how the administration is stifling drilling on public lands. For example, Energy and Environment Daily reports that Senator John Barrasso (R-WY) will ask Jewell “[where she stands on domestic energy development](http://eenews.net/EEDaily/2013/03/04/1), job creation and federal regulations.” Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), the Ranking Member on the committee, said she told Jewell in a meeting last week about “[resource potential](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/27/lisa-murkowski-sally-jewell_n_2777086.html) in Alaska, off-shore and in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and the limitations to access.” And Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) released a statement after Jewell’s nomination announcement that “The [Interior Department’s] approach has [hurt our economy, killed jobs](http://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/2/lee-statement-on-nominee-for-interior-secretary), and prevented states like Utah from generating critical revenue,” so questions about energy on public lands are also likely to come from him. The report released today shows that, despite all of the questions Jewell may get on drilling on public lands, the industry in the end is “following the oil” to nonfederal lands.

#### There’s no quantifiable solvency deficit- only comparative evidence

Markey, 12 -- Rep., House Committee on Natural Resources ranking member

[Edward, "Hearing on Offshore Drilling," CQ Transcriptions, 5-9-12, l/n, accessed 1-31-13, mss]

The majority has also opposed Democratic efforts to get oil companies to start drilling on the leases they already have. Oil companies already hold the offshore drilling rights to **an area the size of Kentucky** on which they are not producing a single barrel of oil. Last year, the Interior Department found that there was **nearly as much** oil and more natural gas under these nonproducing leases -- nonproducing because the oil companies refuse to drill on them, **than we could ever get** from drilling up and down the East and West Coasts of the United States.

### AT: Caperton

#### CP is key to investor certainty – property issue are an alt cause only solve by the aff

Richards & Barnes, ‘9 (A. James, Professor School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Kenneth R. , Associate Professor School of Public and Environmental Affairs, “Toward “Climate Friendly” Coal”, May 2009, http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/faculty/policy\_briefs/coal\_barnes.pdf )

States Must Participate in the Design of Regulations for CCS

While the federal government will bear the primary responsibility for establishing incentives for CCS by controlling the overall emissions of CO2 , it will share with state governments the responsibility for developing regulations to govern the safety, liability, and property rights issues related to the actual implementation of this new technology. Since we don’t know much about the risks, costs, and effectiveness of large-scale CCS projects, stakeholders must undertake the initial demonstration projects in a flexible regulatory environment where both regulators and industry learn from experience. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act Underground Injection Control Program, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is developing regulations for a whole new class of underground injection wells – those intended for use in the long-term storage of CO2 . Rules will be necessary for how CO2 capture translates into allowances, site characterization, and injection well design, allowed injection quantities for a given site, reservoir pressure limits, and the purity of the injected CO2 stream. But deployment of the CCS technology, especially when it involves onshore injection, could also implicate real property rights, a realm traditionally reserved for the states. While the CO2 in a CCS operation will be injected into a single or limited number of injection wells, it eventually spreads quite broadly, potentially permeating pore space below the surface owned by thousands of landowners. The potential for conflict between owners of surface and mineral estates on the one hand, and CCS operators on the other, are substantial. States will have to sort out this sticky property rights issue before developers will be comfortable investing the billions of dollars that are likely to be required to build the first CCS-equipped plants. There are also liability issues. Because only governments can make credible commitments for hundreds of years, it may be necessary for the state (or federal) government to accept the long-term liability of storage sites after they have been closed and secured. The policies (and therefore the associated regulatory constraints) will need to be site-specific, and participating companies will face complex permitting, operational, and closure processes.

### AT: Willson

#### States solve CCS liability questions – fed action not key and state liability is an alt cause

ITFCCS 10. [Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage -- August -- www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ccs/CCS-Task-Force-Report-2010.pdf]

As discussed in Section IV.C.1.1, there already exist Federal and State laws governing CCS activities. In particular, several States have adopted legislation that provides for transfer of longterm liability to the State by various mechanisms. One option would be to not seek additional legal authority, and to proceed on the basis of this existing body of law. A key question is whether, assuming liability concerns will in fact impair adoption of CCS technology, there are ways to address those concerns under this existing legal framework, or whether Congressional action would be required to address those concerns. The existing Federal framework largely does not provide for a release or transfer of liability from the owner/operator to other persons, although some States are experimenting with alternative approaches for addressing concerns about long-term liability under existing law. One mechanism involves States agreeing to take on the long-term liability by undertaking the CCS project themselves, by assuming liability from CCS operators, or by providing a mechanism for transfer of liability. At least six States, and possibly more, have already adopted various forms of legislation that would achieve this result.

### China

**No cooperation and no conflict—structural issues overwhelm**

**Harding ’11** (Harry Harding 11, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html

In my judgment, **it is highly unlikely for** the relationship between **the US and China to be** primarily **cooperative**, at least in the short to medium term. **The differences in values,** political **systems, interests,** levels of **development, and perceptions** of the existing international order **are simply too great** for the two countries to find common ground on all issues, or **even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to pursue common interests**. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately**, an essentially confrontational relationship is** also **unlikely**, especially if one is primarily concernedwith the risks of military conflict. The high degree of economic **interdependence** between the two countries **has** already **created a relatively resilient relationship**. The **cost of** military **conflict**, especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, **will be a significant deterrent** against military conflict. Equally important, the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan – is presently quite low, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.

**No risk of Chinese maritime disputes**

**Fravel ’12** (M. TAYLOR FRAVEL is an associate professor of political science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All Quiet in the South China Sea Why China is Playing Nice (For Now) M. Taylor Fravel March 22, 2012

Little noticed, however, has been **China's recent adoption of a** new -- and **much more moderate -- approach**. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to **restore China's** tarnished **image** in East Asia and to **reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role** there. The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit **paved the way for** an **agreement** in July 2011 **between China and** the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (**ASEAN**) **to finally implement a** declaration of a **code of conduct** they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes." **Since the summer, senior Chinese** officials, especially **top political leaders** such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have **repeatedly reaffirmed** the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's **maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation** while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas." **Authoritative Chinese-**language **media,** too**,** has begun to **underscore the importance of cooperation.** Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies. **In terms** of actually **setting aside disputes, China has made progress**. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands. China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. **The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is** probably **more than just a** mere **stalling tactic**. Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also **halted** many of the more **assertive behaviors** that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, **its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor**. The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? **More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests**. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship. **By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached**. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region. So far, **Beijing's new approach seems to be working**, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

**No US-China war**

**Rosecrance et al ‘10** (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>)

**Will China and the US Go to War?** If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “**no**,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, **China has** gradually **accepted the US-**led **world** order **and become a status quo power.** It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, **China** has **clearly rejected** the option of **territorial expansion.** It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, **it has been trying to settle** its border **disputes through negotiation**. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, **even on** the question of **Taiwan**, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, **it has adopted** a policy of **peaceful reunification**. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, **China has relied on trade** and investment **for** national welfare and **prestige, instead of** military **conquest.** And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that **it** really **sees no other option than** to continue on **this path to prosperity**. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. **There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns** on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

### AT: C02-EOR Reverses Warming (by sucking already emitted C02 out of the ozone)

**This is ludicrous – carbon capture and storage stops Co2 at the point of emission – it has no method to vacuum Co2 out of the atmosphere. Lols.**

**CCS traps emissions as they exit smokestacks. Can’t pull it out of the ozone once it’s emitted.**

**CSL ‘8**

Carbon sequestration leadership forum. http://www.cslforum.org/education/index.html

Carbon sequestration is the capture, from power plants and other facilities, and storage of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases that would otherwise be emitted to the atmosphere. The gases can be captured at the point of emission and can be stored in underground reservoirs (geological sequestration), injected in deep oceans (ocean sequestration), or converted to rock-like solid materials (advanced concepts).

### xt - Kyoto Necessary

#### Carbon regulation key to adoption in US

Holton – the Director of the only successful carbon capture tech in the US – 12

(Steve Holton the Director of Environmental Systems Development at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,

GELLERMAN: Well, the big question is: Can you do it at a low enough cost that it’s not going to drive up the price of coal? HOLTON: Well, it will affect the price of electricity at the end of the day. It’s the energy penalty that’s tough to get below a certain point. We’re getting to the laws of physics that we can’t go any lower. But currently, we can get that energy penalty down to around 17 to 20 percent. GELLERMAN: Which means that you pay about 17 to 20 percent more for electricity produced by burning coal? HOLTON: Well, we’re all waiting for regulation that will drive our market. And once we have our market, and we have that competition there, the expectation is that those costs will go down. GELLERMAN: When you say that you’re waiting for regulation, does that mean that you’re waiting for a cap on carbon so that it would be economically viable to have this process? HOLTON: Yes. Until the government regulates the emissions of CO2, puts some either cap and trade or tax benefits or program in place, then we’re not going to see anyone capturing CO2, because it is expensive. It will have an affect to the consumer and there will be an increase on the cost of electricity. Once we’re in a commercial position and it is regulated and people are forced to do this that will drive the cost of the carbon capture down because of competition and economies of scale, etcetera.

### xt – Too Costly

#### No company or lender is willing to invest in CCS – even after regulations

Johnson 6-11

Steve, “Co-op Rep: EPA Off Base on Carbon,” http://www.ect.coop/public-policy-watch/energy-environment/electric-cooperative-epa-carbo-reduction-rule/45194

A Mid-Atlantic G&T official told a congressional panel that a federal carbon reduction standard impairs the plans of his cooperative and other electric utilities for future baseload generation. David Hudgins said the Environmental Protection Agency has failed to state a clear benefit to its proposed limits on greenhouse gases at new fossil-fuel plants and wrongly assumes that utilities can rely on unproven carbon capture and storage technology to meet them. “No company will take the risk to invest billions of dollars into a power plant in the hopes that CCS technology will be developed,” said Hudgins, director of member and external relations at Old Dominion Electric Cooperative. “Additionally, financial lending institutions will not lend money to construct a plant without a viable technology to demonstrate compliance,” he said. Hudgins testified June 6 at a House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment hearing on environmental regulations, with an emphasis on the costs and benefits of EPA’s new source performance standards for new fossil-fuel power plants. That’s a major matter of concern for Glen Allen, Va.-based ODEC, which serves 11 distribution co-ops in three states. To meet growing demand, it is planning a $5 billion, state-of-the-art baseload plant in southeast Virginia that uses coal and renewable biomass. ODEC has been working on carbon sequestration research, but Hudgins said the technology is unlikely to be commercially viable within a decade, as the agency insists.

**---EXT Can’t Solve**

**Asia pollution offsets any US action – global warming is inevitable**

Knappenberger ‘12 (Paul Knappenberger, Assistant Director of the Cato Institute’s Center for the Study of Science. He holds an M.S. degree in Environmental Sciences (1990) from the University of Virginia as well as a B.A. degree in Environmental Sciences (1986) from the same institution.His over 20 years of experience as a climate researcher have included 10 years with the Virginia State Climatology Office and 13 years with New Hope Environmental Services, Inc., "Asian Air Pollution Warms U.S More than Our GHG Emissions (More futility for U.S. EPA)", [www.masterresource.org/2012/06/asian-air-pollution-warming/](http://www.masterresource.org/2012/06/asian-air-pollution-warming/), June 7, 2012)

“The whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions…. So, what’s the point of forcing Americans into different energy choices?” A new study provides evidence that air pollution emanating from Asia will warm the U.S. as much or more than warming from U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The implication? Efforts by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (and otherwise) to mitigate anthropogenic climate change is moot.¶ If the future temperature rise in the U.S. is subject to the whims of Asian environmental and energy policy, then what sense does it make for Americans to have their energy choices regulated by efforts aimed at mitigating future temperature increases across the country—efforts which will have less of an impact on temperatures than the policies enacted across Asia? Maybe the EPA should reconsider the perceived effectiveness of its greenhouse gas emission regulations—at least when it comes to impacting temperatures across the U.S. New Study A new study just published in the scientific journal Geophysical Research Letters is authored by a team led by Haiyan Teng from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in Boulder, Colorado. The paper is titled “Potential Impacts of Asian Carbon Aerosols on Future US Warming.” Skipping the details of this climate modeling study and cutting to the chase, here is the abstract of the paper: This study uses an atmosphere-ocean fully coupled climate model to investigate possible remote impacts of Asian carbonaceous aerosols on US climate change. We took a 21st century mitigation scenario as a reference, and carried out three sets of sensitivity experiments in which the prescribed carbonaceous aerosol concentrations over a selected Asian domain are increased by a factor of two, six, and ten respectively during the period of 2005–2024. The resulting enhancement of atmospheric solar absorption (only the direct effect of aerosols is included) over Asia induces tropospheric heating anomalies that force large-scale circulation changes which, averaged over the twenty-year period, add as much as an additional 0.4°C warming over the eastern US during winter and over most of the US during summer. Such remote impacts are confirmed by an atmosphere stand-alone experiment with specified heating anomalies over Asia that represent the direct effect of the carbon aerosols. Usually, when considering the climate impact from carbon aerosol emissions (primarily in the form of black carbon, or soot), the effect is thought to be largely contained to the local or regional scale because the atmospheric lifetime of these particulates is only on the order of a week (before they are rained out). Since Asia lies on the far side of the Pacific Ocean—a distance which requires about a week for air masses to navigate—we usually aren’t overly concerned about the quality of Asian air or the quantity of junk that they emit into it. By the time it gets here, it has largely been naturally scrubbed clean. But in the Teng et al. study, the authors find that, according to their climate model, the local heating of the atmosphere by the Asian carbon aerosols (which are quite good at absorbing sunlight) can impart changes to the character of the larger-scale atmospheric circulation patterns. And these changes to the broader atmospheric flow produce an effect on the weather patterns in the U.S. and thus induce a change in the climate here characterized by “0.4°C [surface air temperature] warming on average over the eastern US during winter and over almost the entire US during summer” averaged over the 2005–2024 period. While most of the summer warming doesn’t start to kick in until Asian carbonaceous aerosol emissions are upped in the model to 10 times what they are today, the winter warming over the eastern half of the country is large (several tenths of a °C) even at twice the current rate of Asian emissions. Now let’s revisit just how much “global warming” that stringent U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions may avoid averaged across the country. In my Master Resource post “Climate Impacts of Waxman-Markey (the IPCC-based arithmetic of no gain)” I calculated that a more than 80% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. by the year 2050 would result in a reduction of global temperatures (from where they otherwise would be) of about 0.05°C. Since the U.S. is projected to warm slightly more than the global average (land warms faster than the oceans), a 0.05°C of global temperature reduction probably amounts to about 0.075°C of temperature “savings” averaged across the U.S., by the year 2050. Comparing the amount of warming in the U.S. saved by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions by some 80% to the amount of warming added in the U.S. by increases in Asian black carbon (soot) aerosol emissions (at least according to Teng et al.) and there is no clear winner. Which points out the anemic effect that U.S. greenhouse gas reductions will have on the climate of the U.S. and just how easily the whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by our greenhouse gas emissions reductions. And even if the traditional form of air pollution (e.g., soot) does not increase across Asia (a slim chance of that), greenhouse gases emitted there certainly will. For example, at the current growth rate, new greenhouse gas emissions from China will completely subsume an 80% reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emission in just over a decade. Once again, pointing out that a reduction in domestic greenhouse gases is for naught, at least when it comes to mitigating climate change. So, what’s the point, really, of forcing Americans into different energy choices? As I have repeatedly pointed out, nothing we do here (when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions) will make any difference either domestically, or globally, when it comes to influences on the climate. What the powers-that-be behind emissions reduction schemes in the U.S. are hoping for is that 1) it doesn’t hurt us too much, and 2) that China and other large developing nations will follow our lead. Both outcomes seem dubious at time scales that make a difference

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## Overview

**Immigration is key to climate leadership**

**Madrid ’10** (www.americanprogress.org AP Photo/Seth Perlman From a “Green Farce” to a Green Future Refuting False Claims About Immigrants and the Environment Jorge Madrid October 2010 From a “Green Farce” to a Green Future Refuting False Claims About Immigrants and the Environment Jorge Madrid October 2010 Jorge Madrid is a Research Associate with the energy team at the Center for American Progress. He holds master’s degrees in urban planning and public administration from the University of Southern California and is a former graduate fellow with the Congressional Hispanic Caucus institute.

We need leadership and solutions, not scapegoats To reiterate: The United States will only reach meaningful cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and curb the effects of **climate change through global partnerships**. The United States, as the world’s highest emitter of GHGs, **must lead by example** and not be distracted by those who want **to create** a political wedge between the environmental community and advocates of sensible comprehensive **immigration** reform. **Caving** into such tactics **hinders our path** to a clean and green future **and diminishes our standing as a global leader**. The facts lost in anti-immigrant green farce arguments are critical, and they need to be understood and addressed. For instance: • Thirty-eight percent of U.S. GHG emissions come from buildings. • Commercial and industrial buildings account for as much as 50 percent of U.S. energy use and residential buildings account for another 20 percent. • Twenty-nine percent of U.S. GHG emissions come from transportation. • Seventeen percent of global GHG emissions are caused by deforestation. • Fifty-seven percent of global GHG emissions are caused by burning fossil fuels. • The United States meets 85 percent of its energy needs by burning fossil fuels. How much we consume is definitely a factor in the above figures. And that number is influenced by population and per capita consumption. But more important, these figures represent a problem in how we consume—and that relates to our production, consumption, and distribution systems that are polluting and unsustainable. The United States needs to lead and not scapegoat to solve its own sustainability challenges as well serve as an example for the rest of the developing world. Draconian anti-immigrant policies are not a magic bullet that will set us on the right path. In short, we must focus on solutions instead of tinkering at the margins with misguided and ill-informed anti-immigrant scapegoating. More people do not necessarily equal more stress on the planet, and stopping the flow of immigrants to this country will not solve our environmental challenges. Blaming immigrants for climate change is a sham. In fact, immigrants actually **live greener than most Americans** **and** they can **play a critical role in solving our environmental challenges**. Hate groups and other immigration restrictionists who disguise themselves as environmentalists—who argue for zero net migration, sealing off our borders, and enforcement-only initiatives—must be silenced with the facts to prevent misguided policies and to promote a more reasonable discussion on how to solve our problems. As the nation moves toward comprehensive reform of the federal immigration system immigrants should be considered allies in the fight against climate change and the march toward green policy. In their roles as entrepreneurs and greencollar workers they are **assets in our efforts to revive the economy and implement climate solutions**. This country must examine its own unsustainable systems of energy generation and consumption rather than blame immigrants. And it needs to make tough decisions on how to fix these systems. Our dialogue about sustainability and climate change should focus on real problems and solutions, not fallacies. Freeing the national debate from distractions and political wedges can help the United States lead the global charge toward a cleaner and greener future.

#### Lack of workforce turns the aff – only reform solves.

Council on Competitiveness 9. [ “Mobilizing a World Class Energy Workforce” December -- <http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/CoC_-_Pillar_6_Handout_-_Mobilizing_a_World-Class_Energy_Workforce,_Dec09.pdf>]

America currently lacks an energy workforce of sufficient size and capabilities to meet the needs ¶ of a sustainable, secure energy system.1¶ With increasing demand come abundant job ¶ opportunities in both traditional and emerging energy industries. Unfortunately, U.S. workers are ¶ neither aware nor sufficiently prepared to take them. Moreover, with an aging population and the ¶ retirement of the baby boomers well under way, there is an inadequate pipeline of replacement ¶ workers, technicians and managers to succeed them. ¶ The United States stands to lose half of its electric power industry workforce within the next five to ten ¶ years due to retirement. America’s oil and gas workforce averages 50 years in age; half are likely to retire ¶ soon. Workers in these conventional energy sector jobs, from power plant operators to transmission line ¶ and pipeline workers, are retiring at a much faster rate than they are being replaced. The introduction of ¶ any new energy technologies will not compensate for this workforce shortage. For example, in the nuclear ¶ industry, the fact that there has been no new construction of a nuclear facility in the United States in over ¶ 30 years has led to the atrophy of skills, the loss of technicians, the dearth of American students in ¶ nuclear engineering and a national security risk for the primarily nuclear-powered U.S. Navy. 2 The development, installation and ¶ maintenance of new technologies ¶ require skills at all levels of educational ¶ training. Many of these jobs, such as ¶ building new power plants, cannot be ¶ exported and will remain in the United ¶ States. So-called “green collar” jobs ¶ could fill this gap over time and provide ¶ for significant domestic employment ¶ growth, but capitalizing on this ¶ opportunity will require government ¶ being proactive in developing programs ¶ to provide the necessary skills. ¶ Government should provide a 21st ¶ century education to match the 21st ¶ century job opportunities, requirements ¶ and needs. ¶ There is growing global competition for ¶ scientific and engineering talent today,¶ and the U.S. pipeline of students is ¶ slowing.3¶ The private sector, where the overwhelming majority of careers will be, knows best the current ¶ opportunities that are not being met. Executives cite the lack of scientific, engineering and skilled talent as¶ among the most serious challenges facing their businesses today.4¶ They know what skills will be required ¶ and can assist in developing the workforce of the future by working closely with educational institutions as ¶ well as within their own organizations.

**Immigration turns china energy coop**

**Herman and Smith ‘10** (Richard T. Herman is the founder of Richard T. Herman & Associates, law firm in Cleveland, Ohio, also the co-founder of a chapter of TiE, a global network of entrepreneurs started in 1992 in Silicon Valley. He has appeared on National Public Radio, FOX News, and various affiliates of NBC, CBS, and ABC. He has also been quoted in such publications as USA Today,InformationWeek, PCWorld, ComputerWorld, CIO, Site Selection and National Lawyers Weekly, Robert L. Smith is a veteran journalist who covers international cultures and immigration issues for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio’s largest newspaper. Bob He has written extensively about immigration issues and has interviewed people at all points of the immigrant experience, from undocumented field workers to hugely successful entrepreneurs, Parts of this paper were excerpted from the book “Immigrant Inc.: Why Immigrant Entrepreneurs are Driving the New Economy (and how they will save the American worker)” (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) by Richard T. Herman & Robert L. Smith.  Available wherever books are sold, “Why Immigrants Can Drive the Green Economy,” Immigation Policy Center)

Raymond Spencer, an Australian-born entrepreneur based in Chicago, has a window on the future—and a gusto for investing after founding a high-technology consulting company that sold for more than $1 billion in 2006. “I have investments in maybe 10 start-ups, all of which fall within a broad umbrella of a ‘green’ theme,” he said. “And it’s interesting, the vast majority are either led by immigrants or have key technical people who are immigrants.” It should come as no surprise that immigrants will help **drive the green revolution**. America’s young scientists and engineers, especially the ones drawn to emerging industries like alternative energy, tend to speak with an accent. The 2000 Census found that immigrants, while accounting for 12 percent of the population, made up nearly **half of the all scientists and engineers** with doctorate degrees. Their importance will only grow. Nearly 70 percent of the men and women who entered the fields of science and engineering from 1995 to 2006 were immigrants. Yet, the connection between immigration and the development and commercialization of alternative energy technology is rarely discussed. Policymakers envision millions of new jobs as the nation pursues renewable energy sources, like wind and solar power, and builds a smart grid to tap it. But Dan Arvizu, **the leading expert** on solar power and the director of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy in Golden, Colorado, warns that **much of the clean-technology talent lies overseas**, in nations that began **pursuing alternative energy** sources **decades ago.** Expanding our **own clean-tech industry will require working closely with foreign nations and** foreign-born **scientists**, he said. Immigration restrictions are making collaboration difficult. His **lab’s** **efforts to work with a Chinese energy lab**, for example, **were** **stalled due to U.S. immigration barriers**. “We can’t get researchers over here,” Arvizu, the son of a once-undocumented immigrant from Mexico, said in an interview in March 2009, his voice tinged with dismay. “It makes no sense to me. We need a much more enlightened approach.” Dr. Zhao Gang, the Vice Director of the Renewable Energy and New Energy International Cooperation Planning Office of the Ministry of Science and Technology in China, says that America needs that enlightenment fast. “The Chinese government continues to impress upon the Obama administration that **immigration restrictions are creating major impediments to U.S.-China collaboration on clean energy** development,” he said during a recent speech in Cleveland. So what’s the problem? Some of it can be attributed to national security restrictions that impede international collaboration on clean energy. But Arvizu places greater weight on immigration barriers, suggesting that national secrecy is less important in the fast-paced world of green-tech development. “We are innovating so fast here, what we do today is often outdated tomorrow. Finding solutions to alternative energy is a complex, global problem that requires global teamwork,” he said. **We need** an **immigration** system **that prioritizes** the attraction and retention of **scarce, high-end talent** needed **to invent and commercialize alternative energy technology** and other emerging technologies. One idea we floated by Arvizu was a new immigrant “Energy Scientist Visa,” providing fast-track green cards for Ph.D.s with the most promising energy research, as reviewed by a panel of top U.S. scientists. Arvizu enthusiastically responded, “Wow, that’s a brilliant idea.” As the recent submission of the Startup Visa Act bill suggests, there’s really no shortage of good ideas of leveraging immigration to jumpstart the economy. The challenge is getting the American people to understand that high-skill immigration creates jobs, that the current system is broken, and that action is required now.

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## AT: ALtman

#### Immigration reform will pass soon because Obama’s spending capital

Castaldi 3-27 (Charles, Take Two | KPCC – California Public Radio, March 27th, 2013, “LA Archbishop Gomez keeps Mahony's promise to push for immigration reform,”

President Obama said he expects Congress to introduce an immigration reform bill next month. The Los Angeles Archdiocese has played a key role in advocating for change. Before he was stripped of his duties for mishandling sex abuse cases, Cardinal Roger Mahony was a leading voice on immigration reform.¶ In 2010, Cardinal Mahony spoke to a crowd of thousands at the Washington mall at a rally in support for immigrant’s rights.¶ Mahony promised the Catholic Church would stand beside immigrants in the fight for immigration reform. This was just one of many examples of his bringing his activism out to the street.¶ “Cardinal Mahony was very clear that he was going to use the pulpit and he was going to use the airwaves,” says Angelica Salas, the executive director of CHIRLA, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles. “He was going to march with us, he was going to use whatever public space there was in order to get the word out.”¶ Salas says that Mahony’s successor, Archbishop Jose Gomez, might not be speaking at rallies as much and certainly maintains a lower public profile, but he is very active in pushing for immigration reform.¶ “I was in a meeting with President Obama a couple of weeks ago at the White House with religious leaders,” Gomez says. “And we all came out of the meeting with the conviction that now is the time and that the president is committed to work on immigration reform. So we are enthusiastic about the possibility of an immigration reform law soon.”¶ Gomez is the chairman of the Immigration Committee of US Catholic Bishops, which makes him a key voice on immigration matters not only in the church, but also in Washington as well. Both he and Salas agree that this is a moment when there’s a real chance to see an actual immigration reform bill come out of Congress, especially with the President as committed as he is.¶ “Lots of things have also changed even within the Obama administration,” Salas says. “In 2010, I had the opportunity to meet with President Obama in much the same way that Archbishop Gomez did and at that time we were in a very different situation in which for the first time we were seeing deportations exploding. Something we were shocked to our core about. And so it was a different kind of engagement with our president."¶ But since then, she has seen a change in tone from Washington.¶ "Since that time and after a lot of pushing, he has provided deferred action for childhood arrivals, (Obama) has opened up opportunities for prosecutorial discretion," Salas says. "I think that his entire team at every single level is now committed to making sure that immigration reform gets across the finish line.”¶ Public opinion on immigration has also shifted substantially since Mahony took up the cause more than 20 years ago. Now, according to a recent USC/LA Times poll, about two-thirds of Californians support providing undocumented immigrants a path to citizenship. According to Mike Madrid, a Republican political consultant, Gomez’s low key lobbying might be a better fit for the times.

#### House republicans are on board CIR – momentum

Le 3/20 (Van, “BREAKING NEWS: MORE CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS IN HOUSE MAKING SENSE ON IMMIGRATION,”

Picture this, if you can: A roomful of **House Republicans have nothing but praise for** a fellow Republican who has just come out in favor of immigration reform **with a pathway to citizenship**. As they express support for some version of immigration reform, they are asked if any of them disagree with a plan to legalize the 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the country. They look around, then shake their heads. No one raises an objection. This is no Onion article; it’s Talking Points Memo, on how a near-dozen conservative, A-grade NumbersUSA Republicans at a panel hosted by the Heritage Foundation all support some version of immigration reform in the style of Rand Paul. It was pretty extraordinary when Sen. Paul (R-KY), a Tea Party darling and the winner of last weekend’s CPAC straw poll, came out in favor of immigration reform with citizenship yesterday. Now adding to the lineup of pro-immigration reform Republicans—or Republicans who are at least getting there, are: Rep. Raul Labrador (R-ID), a member of the House Group of 8 who we’ve lambasted before for supporting immigration reform without citizenship. Today he said that he could support a pathway to citizenship as long as it doesn’t create a shortcut for undocumented immigrants: “”What I think should happen is, anybody who’s here illegally can come out of the shadows, become legalized in some way, have some sort of legal status, and the status could lead to legal permanent residency and citizenship eventually, but just the same as anybody else who falls into that category,” he said according to Buzzfeed. Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-SC), who has an A+ career rating from Numbers USA and once compared illegal immigrants to “vagrants” and “animals, today said “I thought [Rand Paul] did a very, very good job in talking about and embracing some ideals of dealing with illegal immigration and embracing some of the reform measures my friends are putting together.” Rep. Trey Radel (R-FL) said “We’re not going to round up millions and millions of people, kids and grandmas and grandpas and send them to wherever,” adding there were both “conservative arguments” and “emotional arguments” that should compel the House to address immigration. From Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH), a former chair of the conservative Republican Study Committee and another career “A” rater from NumbersUSA who once called immigration reform a “misguided approach,” today said, “I think many of us are willing to consider what Raul [Labrador] just described there.” And Rep. Tim Huelskamp (R-KS) told Talking Points Memo he could find plenty to like in a comprehensive bill from a conservative perspective — it would boost to his state’s agricultural business, local Catholic leaders support it, and by granting legal status to undocumented immigrants it would be easier to track and prevent them from using welfare benefits. “[Americans] know the system has been broken,” he said. In short, as TPM noted, immigration reform that legalizes the 11 million is now the conservative floor for reform. The mainstream position is immigration reform with a pathway to citizenship (and as we’ve said many times before, we won’t support anything less). It appears now that the big question isn’t whether there is a path to citizenship, but what that path looks like. It has to be a real path that is achievable for the 11 million aspiring Americans who will apply. All year, the momentum for immigration legislation has only grown — and it now includes some very unlikely supporters, like the Members of Congress on this Heritage panel, including two members (Huelskamp and Schweikert) who were booted from committee assignments at the beginning of this Congress by Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) for voting against leadership from the right too often. Even these conservative hardliners get the changing political dynamics and moral imperatives for reform. It’s got to be driving the likes of Steve King, Lamar Smith, Lou Barletta and James Sensenbrenner crazy that there’s nothing close to a right-wing insurgency building to derail reform in the House right now. That’s not to say those anti-immigrant hardliners won’t try. But we like the **direction this is heading**. We just need to make sure it leads to real reform with a real, achievable path to citizenship.

#### Businesses and Unions have reached an agreement – their evidence is an exaggeration

Sarlin 3/22 (Benjy, AP, “A Huge Fight Between Big Business And Big Labor Is Threatening To Derail Immigration Reform,” http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/chamber-of-commerce/)

Long-simmering tensions between labor and business over importing new workers are spilling out in the open, raising fears that an impasse between two of the biggest stakeholders in the immigration debate could scuttle comprehensive immigration reform. The tone of what had been mostly quiet and behind-the-scenes talks between the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce has been heating up in recent days as Republicans and business lobbyists have gone out of their way to **preemptively** blame unions for killing a bill. It’s not clear whether the public tiff is part of tough final negotiations or a sign that talks are deteriorating — or perhaps both. The union federation and the chamber have been in talks for months, with the blessing of a bipartisan group of senators working on immigration reform, but so far has only produced abarebones set of principles that would create a new class of immigrant workers and a new federal agency to monitor employment trends. Senators in the so-called “Gang of 8” have complained about the two sides’ progress, which could make plans to release legislation before early next month more difficult. Randy Johnson, a senior vice president of the Chamber of Commerce who is tasked with handling immigration issues, took the dispute public on Friday, venting to reporters that business’ demand of 400,000 new guest worker visas was met with a number from labor well below 100,000. He put the chances of a deal at just 50-50. But a source close to the negotiations said the chamber was exaggerating the dispute and that they had “reached agreement on the size, scope, and timing of the program, how the numbers fluctuate, how workers change jobs — everything except for wages.” Negotiators have also agreed to allow temporary workers to eventually obtain green cards, another **key demand** from labor.

#### Compromise now on work visas

Fawn Johnson 3-26

“Why the Fight Over Work Visas Won't Doom the Immigration Bill,” NationalJournal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/why-the-fight-over-work-visas-won-t-doom-the-immigration-bill-20130325>

Make no mistake. The immigration bill being crafted by the “Gang of Eight” senators will include foreign work visas despite warnings from both business and labor that their talks over the issue have broken down. Here’s why. The AFL-CIO, for the first time in its history, has signed off on a work-visa program that would allow employers to bring foreign workers into the United States on a temporary basis. Those visas would come with an assurance that the worker would have access to a green card, possibly as soon as one year after coming into the country. But initially, they are temporary visas. “It would be **a new kind of work-visa program**. It would be dual intent,” said AFL-CIO spokesman Jeff Hauser. This is a big deal. Previously, the AFL-CIO opposed any kind of temporary-visa program. That intransigence caused a highly public split with the Service Employees International Union in 2007. SEIU was willing to embrace some form of temporary work visas for immigrant labor if the broader immigration bill also legalized the currently undocumented population. Now labor is speaking with one voice. They **want legalization for the undocumented population** and are **willing to allow new foreign workers** to come to the country, provided the employers pay them at the same rates they would pay an American worker. The business community has indicated it **can live with those parameters.**

#### Dems on board now with bipartisan bill

Khimm 3-19. [Suzy, reporter, "Five reasons why immigration reform is moving forward" Washington Post -- www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/19/five-reasons-why-immigration-reform-is-moving-forward/]

When the Senate’s “Gang of Eight” came out with a bipartisan framework for an immigration overhaul, there was no shortage of eye-rolling in Washington. Another bipartisan gang? Good luck with that! But then a strange thing happened: The Senate gang started to make progress and hammer out concrete details for a plan—a plan that was mostly in line with the White House’s own ideas for reform. Meanwhile, both the standard-bearers and the upstarts of the Republican Party have begun to echo the call for action.¶ Sure, things could still fall apart when the talks shift to the House. But here’s why things are looking up:¶ 1) We’ve been through this before. The 2006-07 immigration reform talks fell apart, but the passage of time seems to have allowed various stakeholders to cool off and come back to the table to work out a deal. Democrats are more united and relatively less suspicious of the temporary worker programs that raised their hackles the last time around (then-Sen. Obama was among those who voted for an amendment phasing out a guest-worker program), and more prominent Republicans have come around to a path to citizenship.

#### Immigration before budget debates

Hook, 3-24 -- Wall Street Journal Washington bureau political reporter

[Janet, she has covered Congress and national politics since 1995, "Congress Set to Alter Focus After Passing Two Budgets," WSJ, 3-24-13, online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323466204578380820319800066.html, accessed 3-28-13, mss]

Congress Set to Alter Focus After Passing Two Budgets

After the Senate passed its budget this weekend, Congress is expected to pivot to issues such as immigration and guns before attempting a broader deal on taxes, spending and the national debt later this year.

#### The budget is resolved – Obama is investing PC on Immigration

Ford 3/28 (John, Policymic, "Why Obama Signing Sequestration Into Law Was a Strategic Move,")

President Barack Obama finally [signed](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as-obama-signs-sequestration-cuts-his-economic-goals-are-at-risk/2013/03/24/110f7104-9096-11e2-9cfd-36d6c9b5d7ad_story_1.html) the Sequester into law, locking the infamous spending cuts into place, at least until this September. It is rare for a president to sign into a law a program that he actively opposes – President Obama called them "dumb" – so why did this one allow these cuts with relatively little confrontation? At the risk of seeming weak, President Obama is engaging in a tactical withdrawal here, not a retreat. The president sees that no more can be done on the budget stalemate at this time; with [public opinion](http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0223/Sequester-and-public-opinion-Advantage-Obama.-video) favoring him, and a popular mandate still only four months fresh, he is better off using his political capital on other reforms. With over half of his term gone, and a huge laundry list of initiatives still tabled, every move Obama makes is a time management puzzle. And with another inevitable fight on the budget scheduled for the summer, it is time for him to focus on other things for the spring. What is next for the president now that the budget is, for the moment, a settled issue? According to the White House, he is going to emphasize projects that do not require budgetary support: a raise to the minimum wage, immigration, and housing, for example.

## AT: 2014

**Will Pass next month– top of the agenda.**

Silverleib 3-28. [Alan, CNN Congressional Producer, "Immigration tops agenda as senators tour border" CNN Newswire -- www.12newsnow.com/story/21819421/immigration-tops-agenda-as-senators-tour-border]

Immigration tops agenda as senators tour border A bipartisan group of U.S. senators at the heart of the debate over immigration reform toured the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona on Wednesday -- the latest sign of growing legislative momentum on a polarizing issue that has been stalled on Capitol Hill for years.¶ Arizona GOP Sens. John McCain and Jeff Flake were joined on the tour by New York's Chuck Schumer and Colorado's Michael Bennet, both Democrats. The four men are part of a group of eight senators expected to unveil comprehensive legislation soon after Congress returns from its spring break in April.¶ President Barack Obama also stepped up his push for a comprehensive bill, sitting down for interviews with the Telemundo and Univision. While both interviews were embargoed, immigration was expected to dominate the discussion.¶ Speaking at a naturalization ceremony at the White House on Monday, Obama said he expects **significant legislation action next month**.¶ "We are making progress, but we've got to finish the job," the president said. "I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible."¶ House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-California, told reporters Wednesday she is "optimistic" about the chances of legislative success.¶ Democrats and Republicans have been bogged down for years over the question of how best to secure the country's border while resolving the status of roughly 11 million undocumented immigrants. A rare political window appeared to open after last November's presidential election, when GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney performed dismally among Hispanic voters.¶ Despite strong conservative resistance to a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, Republican leaders recognize their party's need to appeal more strongly to America's fastest growing minority group. For his part, Obama is hoping to lock in a major second term legislative victory.¶ A source familiar with the congressional negotiations has told CNN that the eight senators **have tentatively reached agreement on** some of **the thorniest issues, such as a path to citizenship and metrics for securing the border.¶ The groups is also working on a revamped guest worker program**, the source noted.

**Top of the docket – Obama has the GOP on board.**

AFP 3-27. [Agence France-Presse, "Obama expects Senate immigration bill next month" -- www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/03/27/obama-expects-senate-immigration-bill-next-month/]

US President Barack Obama said Wednesday that he expected the Senate would start debating comprehensive immigration reform next month, putting an optimistic spin on the legislation’s prospects.¶ In an interview with the Univision Spanish-language television station, Obama praised a bipartisan group of Democratic and Republican senators working to come up with a joint bill on the issue.¶ “The good news is, it seems like they are actually making progress. My expectation is that we will actually see a bill on the floor of the Senate next month,” he said.¶ In a separate interview with Telemundo, Obama said Congress could pass legislation by this summer.¶ Immigration reform is a centerpiece of Obama’s second-term agenda and would represent a substantial enhancement of his political legacy if he can get it passed.¶ Long-stalled immigration reform efforts gained momentum after the November elections, in which Obama won another term with overwhelming support from Hispanic voters for whom the issue is a motivating one.¶ Obama has **courted Republican leaders on the issue** and a group of senators from both parties is seeking to wrap up an agreement on a proposed law that would bring 11 million undocumented migrants out of the shadows.¶ The senators say their plan would offer a pathway to eventual citizenship, taking up to 13 years or more.¶ The plan would also include steps to better secure US borders and the introduction of an employee verification program.

## AT: Backfires

#### Will pass—Obama push resolves labor union issue

Sarlin 3/29. [Benjy, reporter,“Business And Labor Closing In On Immigration Deal” http://livewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/entry/business-labor-closing-in-on-immigration-deal]

Business and labor leaders believe they are close to a deal on how to handle future immigrant workers, which would provide a tremendous boost to Senate efforts to draft a bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill. ¶ According to the [New York Times,](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/us/politics/guest-worker-program-low-skilled-immigrants.html?hp) officials at the Chamber of Comerce and AFL-CIO are close enough on issues concerning how many visas would be made available to guest workers in an immigration bill and what wages they would be paid. The White House and Senate have been encouraging the talks, hoping to bring both interest groups together in supporting a bill.

#### Obama is carefully managing his approach to avoid backlash

**Sink ‘3-26-13** (After taking hit in the polls, Obama pivots back to immigration reform By Justin Sink - 03/26/13 05:00 AM ET

Obama faces a **delicate high-wire act** on guns and immigration: Claim too much ownership for an issue, and swing-state Republicans who had been considering working with the White House might buck; Sit too far back, **and risk losing steam** on policy initiatives — or allowing Republicans to take credit. “In both of those policy areas**, the president is involving himself carefully**, allowing what **appears to be some momentum in Congress to manage the issues**,” Jillson said. “The president's involvement is modest, if not **behind the scenes,** because there is still enough post-election bad blood among the House GOP that direct presidential involvement drives away support.”

Obama is walking a tightrope – pushing it now carefully- avoiding backlash

Parker 2-14. [Ashley, reporter, "On Immigration, Obama Draws Bipartisan Praise" New York Times -- www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/us/politics/senate-panel-tackles-immigration.html?\_r=0]

President Obama’s **nonconfrontational tone** on an immigration overhaul in his State of the Union address on Tuesday night probably did more to advance the issue, lawmakers said, than if had he offered a fierce rallying cry, as he did about gun restrictions.¶ As senators gathered Wednesday for the first hearing on the proposed sweeping changes in immigration law, they said the president’s decision to give members of both parties room to maneuver on the delicate politics of immigration was a strategic choice that could pay off as negotiations continued.¶ “He’s walking a tightrope here, trying to allow Congress on a bipartisan basis to come up with a comprehensive immigration reform bill in the Senate,” said Senator Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, the No. 2 Senate Democrat. “He encouraged us, told us he doesn’t want this to drag on forever, and if we can’t get it done he’ll play more forceful role.”¶ Mr. Durbin, a member of a bipartisan group of eight senators working on an immigration bill, added, “The reason he’s on this tightrope is the Republicans don’t want to make it appear that they are bending to the president on this issue.”¶ Influential Republicans praised Mr. Obama as well. Representative Paul D. Ryan of Wisconsin, the party’s vice-presidential nominee last year, said the president’s tone on immigration was measured and constructive.¶ “I thought on immigration he used the right words and the right tone, which tells me he actually doesn’t want to politicize this, which is conducive to getting something done,” Mr. Ryan said.¶ Given their losses in the Congressional elections in November, Republicans in both the House and Senate have demonstrated a new openness to immigration changes that could lead to legal residency for millions who have entered the country illegally. At the same time, polls have shown that the president’s involvement in the debate decreases Republican support.¶ White House officials said the president was just as aggressive on immigration as he was on firearms, though his appeal for changes in gun laws was one of the emotional peaks of the night.¶ Cecilia Muñoz, director of the White House Domestic Policy Council, said immigration was “an issue on which we expect an outcome and we expect it soon.”¶ The president, who most recently laid out his own immigration principles in a January speech in Las Vegas, told Congress on Tuesday night that “the time has come to pass comprehensive immigration reform.” It was a refrain he repeated several times to applause.¶ Mr. Obama proceeded to highlight what he believed are the three goals of any immigration deal — ensuring that the borders are secure, creating a meaningful path to citizenship, and overhauling the system to deal with legal immigration. But when talking about immigration, he seemed to lack the emotional resonance, not to mention the forceful call to action, that he exhibited when discussing gun control, where he exhorted the country to remember that all victims of gun violence “deserve a vote.”¶ Which may have been exactly the point.¶ Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, began his remarks at Wednesday’s hearing by thanking the president for his State of the Union comments on immigration.¶ “His remarks last night on immigration were just right,” Mr. Schumer said. “He importuned us to act, he stated how important it was to get this done for the future of America, but at the same time he did not make it a wedge issue. He made it clear that we had to act in a **bipartisan way** and gave us, in our little group, the space to come up with a bipartisan proposal, which we know is really our only hope.”¶ Senator Jeff Flake, Republican of Arizona, and a member of the bipartisan group, said he had “no complaints — actually I thought it was good for the process.”

#### Obama is doing a balancing act on immigration – this strategy will be successful

Grant 2-13. [David, staff writer, "Immigration reform: Why many GOP lawmakers applauded Obama speech" Christian Science Monitor -- www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0213/Immigration-reform-Why-many-GOP-lawmakers-applauded-Obama-speech]

Many Republicans said Obama had handled the **immigration issue deftly**.¶ “I thought on comprehensive immigration reform, I thought his words were **measured**," Rep. Paul Ryan (R) of Wisconsin, House Budget Committee chairman and a longtime supporter of immigration issues, told CNN. "I think the tone and the words he took were productive on that front.”¶ Representative Labrador, meanwhile, went on to suggest a way forward on the contentious matter of whether undocumented immigrants can ever become US citizens.¶ While Obama argued for a path to citizenship for the unauthorized, Labrador recast the problem of citizenship in a way that might appeal to conservative lawmakers, saying what the US needs is not a separate citizenship path for illegal immigrants but rather a smarter legal immigration system that illegal immigrants could access.¶ “I am opposed to creating a new pathway to citizenship only for the illegal aliens," Labrador said. "If we can reform the immigration system so more people can actually immigrate to the United States, we can allow the people that are here illegally right now to actually take advantage of that existing pathway or whatever new pathways we create.”¶ Labrador’s ideas on immigration policy could reverberate among vocal conservatives in the House.¶ Rep. Thomas Massie (R) of Kentucky, who could be straight out of central casting as an immigration reform naysayer, says he is “very interested” in immigration and has learned much from Labrador.¶ Representative Massie says he’d like to see a functional agricultural worker program and would “like to take the folks that are in the shadows out of the shadows.” He opposes a pathway to citizenship just for illegal immigrants, but he doesn't object to undocumented immigrants obtaining citizenship through the legal immigration process.¶ Still, getting from goodwill to good legislation will be a long, long road. And Republicans worry that Obama may make it devilishly hard for them to get to yes.¶ Brady, the Texas congressman, said the **president wasn’t “too bad” on antagonizing Republicans** Tuesday night. But remember, he cautions, “we’ve got a few more days of his campaign yet. **Don’t sell him short**.”

## AT: Gun Control

#### Obama’s not spending capital on gun control – there’s rhetorical support but no legislative support

Chris Cillizza 3-22, “Newtown didn’t change the politics of guns,” Washington Post, 3-22-13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/22/newtown-didnt-change-the-politics-of-guns/

The decision this week by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to drop the assault weapons ban and a ban on high-capacity clips from the broader Congressional effort to curb gun violence sent an unmistakable message: The murders of 20 children in Newtown, Conn., in late 2012 has not changed politics as much as many people thought it might.¶ That’s a hard political truth to hear for many Americans who viewed what happened in Connecticut as a moment when the conversation about guns in America changed. President Obama pledged action. Vice President Biden chaired a White House task force to recommend legislative and executive solutions to curb gun violence. Longtime gun control advocates like New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg (I) and California Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D) insisted that this time — past mass murders involving guns had not moved the needle on a desire for stricter gun laws — was different.¶ And public polling suggested — and continues to suggest — that large majorities favor many of the provisions put forward by Biden’s task force. Nearly six in 10 Americans support banning assault weapons in the latest Washington Post-ABC News poll, and large majorities back expanding background checks to cover all purchases. A smaller majority — though still a majority — favor a ban on high-capacity clips.¶ And yet, as Newtown disappeared further in the political rearview mirror, the same politics that had turned guns into a dormant issue on the national political stage for much of the 1990s and 2000s began to take hold.¶ Senate Democrats up for reelection in Republican-leaning states in 2014 — think Montana, North Carolina, Alaska, Arkansas and Louisiana — were loathe to vote on things like the assault weapons ban out of the fear that their eventual Republican opponent would use such a vote to cast them as out of touch with the average person in their state. According to Reid, less than 40 Senate Democrats were ready or willing to vote for the assault weapons ban.¶ And the White House, perhaps sensing that it would need to spend its political capital on other priorities — debt ceiling/budget fight, immigration and perhaps even climate change — seemed to decide that passing something (even something that didn’t include major provisions like an assault weapons ban or a ban on high capacity clips) was better than passing nothing at all.¶ (President Obama did make clear that he supports the assault weapons ban. But there is a big difference between supporting a piece of legislation and putting the full force of your administration behind convincing wavering members of your party to vote for it.)¶ The simple fact is that despite all of the assertions that Newtown had changed or would change the political dialogue around guns in this country, it wound up reinforcing much of what we already knew about the difficulties of limiting gun rights.

#### Obama not touching gun control.

Mendte 3/26. [Larry, “Mendte: President Obama And Gun Control” KPLR News -- http://kplr11.com/2013/03/26/mendte-president-obama-and-gun-control/]

NEW YORK, NY. (KPLR) – The nation is divided over gun control laws and congress is split over it too. Larry Mendte asks if President Obama has given up on his fight. Remember this ending to the state of the union last month. The president in front of the world demanding a vote for stricter gun control. It was powerful, it was emotional. And as it turns out it was all just theater as the presidential advocate quickly became a realist. By all accounts that was the last real push the white house made for a ban on assault rifles, bullet heavy magazines and background checks. The reality is the legislation never had a chance and the president bailed on it as soon it was obvious that there wasn`t the will or the votes in congress.

#### Obama not spending capital on gun control.

Stirewalt 3-25. [Chris, Politics Editor, "Gun Laws Highlight Deepening Democratic Disarray" Fox News -- www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/25/gun-laws-highlight-deepening-democratic-disarray/]

What the measure needs is not support in the abstract, but actual presidential clout. Reid says that the measure is some 20 votes short of passage, meaning that some 15 Senate Democrats are bucking the president.¶ Obama seems unlikely to do what is required to win Senate passage of such a measure, namely to pressure vulnerable Democrats to switch their votes and take a politically risky stance ahead of Midterm elections. There’s no credible threat to Republicans with Democrats so deeply divided on the issue.¶ Liberals were furious when Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid spiked the most aggressive gun control bill, and given the muted reaction from the White House, one assumes that Reid at least consulted the president before deep sixing an important presidential priority.¶ Obama is looking to regain momentum on the subject, but if his campaign tour is going to be an ode to the merits of the legislative process, the suspicions that the president is not willing to sacrifice his own political capital on behalf of this cherished liberal cause will only deepen.

#### No movement on gun control.

Guthrie 3-22. [Katherine, "March 23: Immigration, guns, Obama in Israel" MSNBC -- tv.msnbc.com/2013/03/22/march-23-immigration-guns-obama-in-israel/]

On Saturday’s Up w/ Chris Hayes, we’ll discuss two of President Obama’s main priorities for his second term: immigration reform and gun control. In the wake of the shooting in Newtown, CT, it seemed that Congress was moving towards overhauling the country’s current gun laws. However, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced Tuesday he would not include Senator Diane Feinstein’s measure to ban assault weapons. Instead, the bill will be considered as an amendment. At the same time, it appears that Congress is backing away from strong universal background check legislation, despite Reid’s assurances.

## AT: XO

**Obama won’t do an XO, even if CIR fails**

**Hamilton ‘3-26-13** (How Obama Could (but Probably Won't) Stop Deporting Illegal Immigrants Today The government spends $5 billion a year detaining and deporting immigrants who may soon be eligible for amnesty over minor infractions. Why not just pardon them instead? KEEGAN HAMILTON, MAR 26 2013, 8:01 AM ET

But even if executive-branch lawyers **could put forth a legal rationale** for the move, there are **political reasons** why Obama **would likely be reluctant** to make it. Although potentially cementing loyalty from a generation of Latinos, a **mass pardon would likely be deeply unpopular with moderates and liberals who put faith in the legislative process, and would be considered downright treasonous by** many **Republicans.** **Obama could face Congressional censure or** perhaps even **impeachment** if he had any time remaining in office, **and** the **backlash against Democrats could make the Tea Party-fueled**, Obamacare-inspired **shellacking of 2010 look mild.** "If in December 2016 Obama says, 'Unconditional pardon to everybody in the country illegally,' **that would totally dismantle Democratic Party** governance for a generation," Mayer says. **"I don't think he wants that** to be his legacy."

#### Obama won’t do major immigration changes through XOs – prefer our ev – it actually cites Obama – theirs is just posturing from Democratic senators with a political incentive to scare the opposition.

Krikorian 12. [Mark, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, "The president's unconstitutional DREAM amnesty gets rolling" Center for Immigration Studies -- cis.org/OpedsandArticles/DREAM-Amnesty-Begins-Krikorian-National-Review]

The president knows what he’s doing is unconstitutional. We don’t have to read his mind to know this — he’s said it repeatedly. In July of last year, he told the National Council of La Raza, “The idea of doing things on my own is very tempting, I promise you, not just on immigration reform. But that’s not how our system works. That’s not how our democracy functions.” In September he told some journalists: I just have to continue to say this notion that somehow I can just change the laws unilaterally is just not true. We are doing everything we can administratively. But the fact of the matter is there are laws on the books that I have to enforce. And I think there’s been a great disservice done to the cause of getting the DREAM Act passed and getting comprehensive immigration passed by perpetrating the notion that somehow, by myself, I can go and do these things. It’s just not true.

#### Congress key to visas- set quota levels

Endelman 9 (Gary, Ph.D. in History – University of Delaware and JD – University of Houston, and Cyrus D. Mehta, JD – Columbia Law School and Managing Member – Mehta & Associates, “The Path Less Taken: Is There an Alternative to Waiting for Comprehensive Immigration Reform?”, 2-25, http://www.cyrusmehta.com/Print\_Prev .aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus200922512947

There are those who argue that only Congress can make immigration policy in this fundamental way and this reservation is both serious and worthy of deep respect. Yet, we have a dysfunctional Congress that is or appears to be incapable or unwilling to reach consensus on immigration. Do we as a society simply throw up our hands and do nothing, allowing a bad situation to become worse or do we use this challenge as an opportunity to create something better through temporary and targeted executive action that Congress can either overturn or accept at a later date? There are several examples of administrative action to create new immigration policy in the face of Congressional inaction in recent years. In the STEM OPT regulation, the USCIS openly admitted that granting an additional 17 months of employment authorization was a regulatory response to an inadequate H1B quota. When they limited the validity of a labor certification of 180 days, the US Department of Labor did so on their own without the fig leaf of legislative authorization.[17](http://www.cyrusmehta.com/Print_Prev.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus200922512947#_ftn20) Remember when the AAO handed down the decision in New York State Department of Transportation,[18](http://www.cyrusmehta.com/Print_Prev.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus200922512947" \l "_ftn21) thus effectively repealing the national interest waiver statute for several years until the relaxation came?[19](http://www.cyrusmehta.com/Print_Prev.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus200922512947#_ftn22) Finally, under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1996, even if the Cuban national entered without inspection, the former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner clarified that the Service could use its authority under the humanitarian and significant public benefit criteria in Section 212(d)(5) to parole Cubans who had entered without inspection under the fiction that the individual would surrender to the government, which in turn would release or parole him or her, and thus render them eligible for adjustment of status under the CAA.[20](http://www.cyrusmehta.com/Print_Prev.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus200922512947#_ftn23) Did Congress tell them they could do that? All of these actions, and many others not singled out, had profound effect but depended solely upon the imaginative exercise of executive authority yet consonant with a proper respect for separation of powers. So we can do so here. Those who do not think so ignore at their own peril and ours the fundamental distinction between making policy, which only Congress can do, and implementing tactical adjustments, which the Executive is uniquely suited to do. This is why only Congress can create a legal status while the Attorney General can authorize a period of stay. This is why only Congress can enlarge the EB quota but the Executive can allow adjustment applications without a quota expansion so long as final approval is not forthcoming. This is why only Congress sets visa limits while the Executive can grant parole. This is why only Congress sets work visa law but the Executive can issue EADs. To suggest that Congress must act in both a long and short term context is to ignore the historic and legitimate differences between the two branches of government. If Congress wants to overturn such executive action, it can do so. Likewise, if it supports the President, it can stay its hand. Either way, Congress is expressing its will, whether through positive action in the form of legislation or negative action in the form of silent acquiescence. Both action and its absence are authentic manifestations of congressional intent. In reality, we all know that there are 40 votes in the Senate to uphold such regulatory initiative. Congress will be more than content to allow the President to take the lead and solve what it has manifestly been powerless to solve- how to regulate both past and future migration flows; how to solve the growing unskilled worker backlog; how to ameliorate the gratuitous cruelty of the 3/10 year bars; how to reduce the size of the undocumented population who may already working here and contributing to the exchequer and how to satisfy the hungry manpower needs of employers once the dark cloud of recession lifts without creating a single new immigrant visa.

**All XO’s have been small scale- large scale XO action will never happen**

**Stein ’10** (Sam Stein stein@huffingtonpost.com | HuffPost Reporting Become a Fan Get Email Alerts from this Reporter 'Smoking Gun Amnesty Memo' Prompts GOP To Demand Hearings First Posted: 08- 4-10 11:09 AM | Updated: 08- 5-10 12:45 PM

Senate Republicans are demanding hearings into a leaked Department of Homeland Security memo that has stoked conservative fears that the Obama administration is pursuing de facto amnesty for millions of undocumented immigrants. But a closer look at the issue, and the circumstances surrounding the memo, suggest that the calls for hearings are more likely driven either by **politics or paranoia**. On Tuesday, the Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee sent a letter to Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) insisting that he "schedule a hearing as soon as possible" into an internal memorandum leaked last week from Citizenship and Immigration Services, a subset of DHS. The memo in question laid out a variety of available options the agency could take to "reduce the threat of removal for certain individuals present in the United States without authorization." Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), who reportedly released the document, insisted that the White House was planning to skirt congressional authority in efforts to grant amnesty to a wide swath of immigrants. Soon conservative media outlets began howling with discontent. "Smoking Gun Amnesty Memo Discovered," blared Fox News. Hoping to quiet the noise, the Obama administration noted early on that the memo in discussion has no date on it, is an internal draft without an official sign-off **and goes against the grain of actual administration policy --** there have been after all, a record number of removals of undocumented immigrants under the Obama administration. And while the administration has already taken steps to make obtaining citizenship easier for those undocumented immigrations who have spouses or relatives in the armed services, it has done so at the behest of Republicans and Democrats. If the White House is **secretly planning** to legalize a **large class of people** in the **absence of Congressional action**, **logic dictates that they would have done it by now.** As one aide told the Huffington Post, **the president has, on several occasions, told** grassroots **groups lobbying** the White House that **his obligation is to enforce federal laws and not use executive powers to grant de facto relief**. "Some of the grassroots groups lobbied us **to provide large-scale administrative relief** in a meeting **directly with the President and he told them no,"** the aide relayed. "He said, in no uncertain terms, that he needs to enforce the law and that the administration was trying to get a bill through Congress that resolves the situation." Perhaps the most persuasive form of pushback, however, was provided by the White House to the Huffington Post. In a letter written to Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex) back on May 13, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet **Napolitano explicitly ruled out the idea that the executive branch could give blanket amnesty to an entire class** undocumented workers.

## AT: Hirsch

**Hirsch- doesn’t say PC irrelevant just says it’s complex-evaluate our specific arguments**

Hirsch, 2-7-13

(Michael National Journal chief correspondent, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital”, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>, DOA: 2-9-13)

**The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term.** Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is**, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”** The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. **Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits**. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.

**Hirsh says it DEPENDS on picking the right issues --- links prove the plan is wrong**

Hirsch, 2-7-13

(Michael National Journal chief correspondent, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital”, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>, DOA: 2-9-13)

And then **there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong**. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. **The problem was** that **whatever credibility** or stature Bush thought **he had earned** as a newly reelected president **did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes**. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But **there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform**. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… **Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill**. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.

**Energy is an irredeemable fight-disrupts his push on immigration**

**Harder, National Journal, 2-6-13**

(Amy, “In Washington, Energy and Climate Issues Get Shoved in the Closet”, [www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206](http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206), DOA: 2-9-13)

At a news conference where TV cameras in the back were nearly stacked on top of each other, an influential bipartisan group of five senators introduced legislation late last month to overhaul the nation’s immigration system. The room was so crowded that no open seats or standing room could be found. A week later, one senator, Republican Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, was standing at the podium in the same room to unveil her energy-policy blueprint. There were several open seats and just a few cameras. At least one reporter was there to ask the senator about her position on President Obama’s choice for Defense secretary, former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel. “I’m doing energy right now,” Murkowski responded. “I’m focused on that.” Almost everyone else on Capitol Hill is focused on something else. Aside from the broad fiscal issues, Congress and the president are galvanizing around immigration reform. Four years ago, the White House prioritized health care reform above comprehensive climate-change legislation. The former will go down in history as one of Obama’s most significant accomplishments. The latter is in the perpetual position of second fiddle. “To everything,” Murkowski interjected fervently when asked by National Journal Daily whether energy and climate policy was second to other policies in Washington’s pecking order. Murkowski, ranking member of the Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said she hoped the Super Bowl blackout would help the public understand the importance of energy policy. “This issue of immigration: Why are we all focused on that? Well, it’s because the Republicans lost the election because in part we did not have the Hispanic community behind us,” Murkowski said this week. “What is it that brings about that motivation? Maybe it could be something like a gap in the Super Bowl causes the focus on energy that we need to have. I can only hope.” It will take more than hope. Elections have consequences, but so far the only kind of electoral consequence climate and energy policy has instigated is one that helped some lawmakers who supported cap-and-trade legislation to lose their seats in the 2010 midterm elections. For the pendulum to swing the other way—for lawmakers to lose their seats over not acting on climate and energy policy—seems almost unfathomable right now. Billions of dollars are invested in the fossil-fuel power plants, refineries, and pipelines that the country depends on today. The companies that own this infrastructure have a business interest in keeping things the way they are. Immigration reform doesn’t face such formidable interests invested in the status quo. “They [businesses] have employees—real, visible people—who they value and who they want to make legal as soon as possible,” said Chris Miller, who until earlier this year was the top energy and environment adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. On energy and climate-change policy, Miller added, “You’re probably never going to have anything like the fence in the Southwest or the border-control issue that **push**es action and debate **on immigration**, because climate-change impacts will likely continue to be more abstract in the public's mind until those impacts are so crystal-clear it’s too late for us to do anything.” Another, tactical reason helps build momentum on immigration and not on other issues. **Obama can capitalize on immigration** as it becomes more of a wedge issue within the GOP. On energy and climate policy, Obama faces a unified Republican Party. “**The president has cracked the code on how to push his agenda items through**. He learned from his victories on the payroll tax and the fiscal cliff that the key is to stake out the political high ground on issues that poll in his favor while exploiting the divisions within the GOP,” said a former Republican leadership aide who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. “**With this in mind, the next logical place for him to go is immigration. Unlike issues like energy** or tax reform where the GOP is united, he can claim a big win on immigration reform while striking a political blow to Republicans.”

#### PC key to force a vote- history proves

Brownstein 13 (National Jouranl, 1/31/13, On Immigration, What Obama Can Learn From Bush's Failed Efforts, www.nationaljournal.com/columns/political-connections/on-immigration-what-obama-can-learn-from-bush-s-failed-efforts-20130131)

The prospects for major immigration reform are now the brightest in years, but for key players in Washington, a shadow still looms: the ghost of 2006. That was the last time the stars were aligned for a breakthrough. Immigration reform that included a path to citizenship for those in the United States illegally had the support of President Bush, a broad labor-business-faith coalition, and a bipartisan Senate majority. Yet that armada ultimately splintered against the stony refusal of House Republican leaders to consider a bill opposed by a majority of their majority. Any of that sound familiar? Already many of the same dynamics are developing, with President Obama stamping immigration reform as a top priority, a bipartisan Senate coalition reassembling, a broad outside alliance of support groups coalescing—and most House Republicans rejecting anything that hints at “amnesty” for illegal immigrants. Yet the contrasts between now and 2006, particularly in the political climate, are also significant. Understanding both the similarities and the differences will be critical for reform advocates if they are to avoid replicating the disappointment they suffered under Bush. Presidential interest was then, as it is now, critical in elevating immigration reform. Since his days as Texas governor, Bush had courted Hispanics, and—even during the 2000 GOP presidential primary campaign—he strikingly defended illegal immigrants as “moms and dads” trying to make a better life for their children. Together with his political “architect,” Karl Rove, Bush saw comprehensive reform that coupled a path to citizenship with tougher enforcement as an opportunity to consolidate the beachhead that allowed him to capture more than 40 percent of Hispanic voters in his 2004 reelection. But Bush largely looked away when Republicans who controlled the House channeled that impulse in a very different direction. In December 2005, they passed an enforcement-only bill drafted by Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, that, for the first time, designated all undocumented immigrants as felons. (Previously, illegal presence in the U.S. had been a civil, not criminal, violation.) Initially, debate in the GOP-controlled Senate drifted. Majority Leader Bill Frist, considering a 2008 presidential bid, pushed his own enforcement-only bill. But amid the backdrop of huge public rallies against Sensenbrenner’s proposal, Sen. Arlen Specter unexpectedly joined with three other Republicans and all eight Judiciary Committee Democrats in late March to approve a comprehensive plan, including a path to citizenship, that followed a blueprint negotiated by Sens. Edward Kennedy and John McCain. When broader Senate agreement teetered over the terms of legalization, Republican Sens. Chuck Hagel and Mel Martinez devised a compromise that divided illegal immigrants into three categories, requiring those here less than two years to leave but allowing those with deeper roots to eventually earn citizenship by paying fines and learning English. After Bush finally delivered a national address on immigration, a bill embodying that plan cleared the Senate with 62 votes, including support from 23 Republicans. House Republicans immediately signaled their disinterest by refusing to appoint a conference committee and instead scheduled hearings in border communities to highlight security lapses. “Border security reigned supreme,” recalls Ron Bonjean, the communications director for then-Speaker Dennis Hastert. “I remember being in a meeting with … the leadership where pollsters came in and said border security was the key to our reelection.” Even in 2006, something like the Senate plan likely could have attracted 218 votes in the House—but not a majority of Republicans. Faced with a collision between his two political imperatives—courting Hispanics and mobilizing conservatives—Bush blinked**, allowing House leaders to replace the Senate bill with enforcement-only legislation**, which he signed that fall. These choices began the GOP’s slide among Hispanics that continues unabated: Hispanic support for Republican House candidates plummeted from 44 percent in 2004 to just 29 percent in 2006, presaging Mitt Romney’s disastrous 27 percent showing among those voters in 2012. That slippage is one of the two most important differences in the political environment around immigration between 2006 and today. Back then, as Bonjean notes, hardly any House Republicans argued that the GOP needed to pass a plan attractive to minorities. But many GOP leaders now see that as self-preservation. “The political imperative has shifted the tectonic plates,” says Frank Sharry, a key player in the 2006 debate who remains central as executive director of America’s Voice, which backs full citizenship for immigrants. “Immigration was viewed as a wedge issue for Republicans in 2006. Now it’s viewed as a wedge issue for Democrats.” The “Gang of Eight” proposal released this week makes it likely that, as in 2006, the Senate will eventually pass a bipartisan immigration bill. Once again, there are probably 218 House votes for such a plan, but not a majority of the majority Republicans. **That raises a**nother **key difference** from 2006: Hastert faced little pressure to consider the Senate bill, because Bush bit his tongue when the speaker buried it**.** If House Republicans shelve another bipartisan Senate plan in 2013, they should expect much more public heat, because Obama won’t be as deferential.

**Obama PC key on immigration---persuasion and ability to bargain are key**

Bernstein 1-28 (Jonathan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at UTSA, 1/28/13, “On immigration, Obama should opt for a persuasive vagueness,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/01/28/on-immigration-obama-should-opt-for-a-persuasive-vagueness/)

Ezra Klein made an excellent point about Barack Obama and immigration reform today:¶ Republicans will fight most anything Obama proposes…This is a frustrating fact of life for the Obama administration — and perhaps even a sick commentary on how our political system works — but it is, nevertheless, a fact: Their involvement polarizes issues. And it’s not unique to them: Presidential involvement in general polarizes issues. By staying out, at least for now, the Obama administration is making it easier for Republicans to stay in.¶ The political scientist Richard Neustadt said that the power of the presidency really just meant the power to persuade. But by that he didn’t really mean winning debate-style arguments. Yes, that can happen, but usually presidents persuade by bargaining — by capitalizing on all the things presidents can do to convince others that they should do what the president wants them to do.¶ In this instance, if Klein is correct — and I’m pretty sure he is — the way for Obama to “persuade” is to be as vague about the new bipartisan Senate proposal as he can, at least in public. At the same time, the White House may need to push for specific provisions behind the scenes.¶ And the dance is probably more complicated than that, because it’s not just presidents who polarize, after all. A full-throated embrace of the bipartisan deal by the “usual suspect” liberal groups could easy scare off Republican support; on the other hand, if they oppose the deal, it could make it hard for mainstream liberals to support it. Assuming that the administration both wants the bipartisan package to be the basis for a bill that passes — but that the president also has preferences on details that are up for grabs — he may have strong preferences on how liberal groups react. And yet the president cannot force them to do what he wants; he can only, yes, persuade them. In doing so, he may call upon whatever trust they have in their past history together, or he may be bargaining with them. After all, each group involved has other things they want from the Obama Administration.¶ All of which is only to say that the correct steps for the president are usually difficult to find. The president needs the cooperation of all sorts of people (not just Members of Congress) who don’t have to do what he wants; then again, no one else in the American political system has more potential ways to influence (“persuade”) others. And from the outside, not only is it sometimes hard to know what the president should be doing to persuade — but it’s not even always obvious who needs persuading (Members of Congress? Which ones? Interest groups? Again, which ones? Parts of the bureaucracy?).

**Best political science research disproves Hirsch- PC is key and finite**

**Beckmann and McGann ‘8** (http://jtp.sagepub.com Journal of Theoretical Politics DOI: 10.1177/0951629807085818 2008; 20; 201 Journal of Theoretical Politics Matthew N. Beckmann and Anthony J. McGann Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States, MATTHEW N. BECKMANN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. He is currently working on a book-length project that explains and tests a new theory of presidents’ inﬂuence on Capitol Hill, 1953–2004. ANTHONY J. MCGANN is Associate Professor of Political Science at theUni- versity of California, Irvine and Reader in Government at the University of Essex.)

A second question focuses on presidents’ role in polarized politics. Even as empiricists have cited presidents as key legislative players – in agenda setting as well as coalition building (Rossiter, 1956; Neustadt, 1960; Covington, 1987, 1988; Sullivan, 1988, 1990; Edwards, 1989; Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Peterson, 1990; Covington et al., 1995; Cameron, 2000; Edwards and Barrett, 2000) – to date the theoretical models have largely conﬁned presidents to a reactive role, that of a veto player.7 Below **we incorporate presidents as strategic players into** the theoretical **models** of lawmaking when proactively promoting preferred poli- cies. In doing so, we not only specify elements of this strategy but also examine the conditions under which they will be effective. Finally, what does this mean for the policies that the president ultimately signs into law? The foremost implication of the preference-based models is that all congressional paths funnel toward the center of congressional members’ pre- ferences. But listening to the Capitol’s so called ‘centrists’ suggests federal laws frequently deviate from their preferences. Seemingly pivotal lawmakers regularly pronounce a bittersweet assessment of their chamber’s products – better than nothing but far from ideal. Our ﬁnal question, therefore, examines whether all lawmaking involves moves toward the center of the ideological spectrum or whether some conditions enable presidents to pull outcomes away from the phil- osophical middle and toward the ideological extreme. Overcoming the Ideological Divide To this point it has been argued that polarization tends to promote gridlock. Par- tisan polarization does so inasmuch as it encourages lawmakers to put posturing ahead of negotiating, and ideological polarization does so inasmuch as it reduces the range of issues where pivotal voters can agree to pass any new law over the status quo. Here we build from this theoretical baseline to examine the effect of incorporating two important stylistic features: presidents and polarization. The Wellsprings of Presidential Power In his seminal work on the presidency, Richard Neustadt (1960) cited the ofﬁce’s informal levers of power – not its constitutional levers of power – as central to understanding presidents’ role in American politics generally, and federal lawmaking in particular. For Neustadt, these informal powers were rooted in the presidency’s unrivaled perspective and prestige; for Sam Kernell (1993), they stem from presidents’ **unique capacity to rally public pressure against otherwise recalcitrant lawmakers** (see also Canes-Wrone, 2005). And beyond personal persuasion and ‘going public’, presidents and their aides **also enjoy a distinct ability to engage in what political scientists call vote-buying** and Washington insiders call ‘horse-trading’.8 Whatever the president’s tactical choice – private persuasion, public pressure, or vote buying – they all ﬁt under the same strategic umbrella; each reﬂects the president’s allocation of president-controlled resources to alter lawmakers’ posi- tions. As such, we employ the omnibus concept of ‘presidential political capital’ to capture this class of presidential lobbying. More precisely, we deﬁne presidents’ political capital as the resources White House ofﬁcials can allocate to induce changes in lawmakers’ position on roll-call votes.9 This deﬁnition of presidential political capital comports well with previous scholarship (e.g. Groseclose and Snyder, 1996) as well as contemporaneous accounts of White House lobbying. For example, after watching the administration’s recent effort before a vote on an important trade bill, the next-day’s Washington Post article described the situation: So many top Bush administration ofﬁcials were working the Capitol last night that Democrats joked that the hallways looked like a Cabinet meeting . . . The last-minute negotiations for votes resembled the wheeling and dealing on a car lot . . . Members took advantage of the opportunity by requesting such things as fundraising appear- ances by Cheney and the restoration of money the White House has tried to cut from agriculture programs. (Blustein and Allen, 2005: s. A) Nearly 20 years earlier, Ronald Reagan’s OMB 251), described a similar scene: ‘The last 10 percent or 20 percent of the votes needed for a majority of both houses on the 1981 tax cut had to be bought, period’. Applying the well-known vote-buying models (see Snyder, 1991; Groseclose, 1996; Groseclose and Snyder, 1996) to this setup, we show how **presidents can strategically target their political capital to legislators** to the end of **inﬂuencing** lawmakers and the **policies they pass.** From there we incorporate polarization into the model to show how it conditions the president’s inﬂuence. The Basic Model To start, let us consider a simple vote-buying game. There are two types of players: a president who seeks to buy votes such that the Senate passes legisla- tion more to his liking than it otherwise would, and senators, who must balance the utility they derive from voting in line with their default ideal with the beneﬁts that the president offers. Hence we assume that the legislative outcome can be described as a point on the Real number line. The president’s utility function is: Up = Aðo, pÞ − B where o is the outcome, p is the president’s ideal point and B is the sum of poli- tical capital the president spends. Let us assume that p ≥ o ≥ status quo (i.e., that the president wishes to move the outcome to ‘the right’.) Furthermore, assume that A (o, p) is a function of the distance between the outcome and presi- dent’s ideal – increasing as the outcome (o) approaches his ideal (p). The utility function of a senator is a function of whether they vote yea or nay, and whether they support the proposal sufﬁciently to vote for it absent any presi- dential pressure or bribe: If si ≤ o: Yea: Ui = Ci ðo, si Þ + bi Nay: Ui = 0 If si ≥ o Yea: 0 Nay: −Ci ðo, si Þ + bi where bi is the political capital offered to each individual senator, si is the sena- tor’s ideal point and C (o, si Þ is a function of the distance between o and s i – with senators’ utility increasing as the distance between the outcome and their ideal decreases. One interpretation of senators’ ideal points is the most extreme outcome a senator will support without a bribe. Senators for whom si ≥ o will support proposal o without being lobbied, and indeed would have to be lobbied not to support it, whereas senators for whom si < o will not vote for proposal o unless the president expends some political capital on them. Like Groseclose and Snyder (1996), we assume senators derive utility from their revealed prefer- ence over policies, not just the outcome. As a ﬁrst point, it is worth stating the obvious: **the greater the president’s political capital, the greater his ability to inﬂuence legislators’ votes**. If bi = 0 – either because the president chose not to get involved or because he lacks political capital to spend – then the White House is limited to the familiar role of veto bargaining (see Cameron, 2000). Indeed, when unwilling or unable to spend the political capital that presidential lobbying demands, the president and his team **cannot push a proactive legislative agenda**. By contrast, as bi increases, the administration’s ability to ply any particular member increases, thereby granting presidents a positive role in the policymaking process.

**Empirically winners win fails**

**Politico ’12** (10 quotes that haunt Obama Published: Tuesday, October 02, 2012, 4:51 AM Updated: Tuesday, October 02, 2012, 5:48 AM By Politico , POLITICO - TOP Full Stories

Obama's errant assumptions about the politics of health care shaped his presidency in other ways. Recall the "big bang" strategy from 2009. The plan was that his first year in office would produce a trio of legislative achievements: reform of health care, reform of the financial services sector and a cap-and-trade measure to limit carbon emissions. The idea was that victory would beget victory, and that a rapid string of first-year successes would infuse years two, three and four of his presidency with even greater momentum. Obama achieved two of the three -- cap-and-trade fell by the wayside -- **though it took longer than expected. But,** far from generating new momentum, each victory drained his political capital. **The result is that Obama has had few big domestic policy achievements since 2010.**

**Winners win doesn’t apply to immigration- using a more effective nuanced approach**

**Parnes and Stanage ‘3-4-13** (http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/285909-new-obama-strategy-taking-no-prisoners New Obama strategy: Take no prisoners By Niall Stanage and Amie Parnes, Writers for the Hill- 03/04/13 06:00 AM ET

While Obama’s **overall approach** at the card table is more aggressive, **the president’s strategy can** still **differ quite markedly from hand to hand**. On the sequester, for instance, Obama did little more than pay lip-service to the idea of a last-minute compromise to avert the package of cuts. By the time he met with congressional leaders on Friday, any realistic hope of such a deal had expired. The meeting seemed like mere theater. **However, on immigration**, the leak of details from a White House proposal first appeared to diminish the chances of progress. **Obama quickly got immigration reform back on track by making phone calls to the leading Republicans on the issue**, **including** Sens. John **McCain** (Ariz.), Lindsey **Graham** (S.C.) **and** Marco **Rubio** (Fla.). **McCain and Graham were subsequently invited to a White House meeting** last week. Afterward, **Graham insisted that it was “one of the best meetings I ever had with the president.”** Tony Fratto, a former deputy press secretary for President George W. Bush, said that **any evaluation of Obama’s second-term approach needs to acknowledge these nuances.** “I don’t think it’s **some kind of second-term infusion of courage**,” he said. “**It’s very tactical in the way they deal with issues.”**

**Empirics disprove winners win, and it’s too slow to matter**

**Lashof 10** – director of the National Resource Defense Council's climate center, Ph.D. from the Energy and Resources Group at UC-Berkeley (Dan, “Coulda, Shoulda, Woulda: Lessons from Senate Climate Fail.” NRDC Switchboard Blog. http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dlashof/coulda\_shoulda\_woulda\_lessons.html)

Lesson 2: Political capital is not necessarily a renewable resource. Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I’m sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success. A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama’s political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but **only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital and created the Tea Party** movement. Public support for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. But this is **occurring too slowly to rebuild Obama’s political capital in time to help push** climate **legislation** across the finish line.

**It’s empirical – energy policy is NEVER a win for Obama**

**Eisler ’12** (4/2/12 (Matthew, Research Fellow at the Center for Contemporary History and Policy at the Chemical Heritage Foundation”)

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the [Keystone XL pipeline](http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/21/obama-angers-both-environmentalists-and-energy-companies-by-supporting-keystone-pipelines-south-leg/) and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by[forces](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/politics/obama-to-promote-energy-policy-on-4-state-trip.html?_r=2&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1332342006-6OFWK5chxZ+cEgBTM7CcQw) beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the [fear premium](http://www.slate.com/articles/business/project_syndicate/2012/03/the_iran_israel_conflict_could_cause_another_global_recession_here_s_how_.html) through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President Obama has accrued no political capital from his energy policy from either the left or the right by the end of his first term.

**Winners win is wrong now- AND Obama thinks it’s wrong so the strategy will fail**

Calmes 11-12-12 (Jackie, NYTimes, 2012, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies - in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. **Obama**'s presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do." "They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then **there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide** theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, **they've learned** a lot, I think."¶ "Effective leaders," he added, "**exploit opportunities rather than create them**."¶ The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards.¶ "This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' "¶ For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes."¶ The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans - or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans - that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits.¶ Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday.¶ His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties.¶ Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that."¶ The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.

**Winners lose specifically for Obama’s second term**

**Walsh 12** Ken covers the White House and politics for U.S. News. “Setting Clear Priorities Will Be Key for Obama,” 12/20, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/Ken-Walshs-Washington/2012/12/20/setting-clear-priorities-will-be-key-for-obama

And there is an axiom in Washington: Congress, the bureaucracy, the media, and other power centers can do justice to only one or two issues at a time. Phil Schiliro, Obama's former liaison to Congress, said Obama has "always had a personal commitment" to gun control, for example.¶ But Schiliro told the New York Times, "Given the crisis he faced when he first took office, **there's only so much capacity in the system to move his agenda**." So Obama might be wise to **limit his goals now and avoid overburdening the system**, or he could face **major setbacks** that would **limit his power** and credibility **for the remainder of his presidency.**